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The Caribbean Basin has been a focus of international strife for
over 150 years. Because of the Basin's proximity to the United States,
the economic and political stability of the Caribbean Basin has been
important to the United States. As a result, the United States has pro-
moted economic development by means of trade programs and aid
packages with the goal of economic growth and economic stabilization.
Two United States programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative1 (CBI)
and section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, are examples of the
United States effort.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative was designed to allow qualified
Caribbean nations to trade more favorably with the United States.
Under this program Caribbean nations receive benefits in the form of
aid, 2 trade,' and private investment.4 Principal economic provisions of
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1985, Bob
Jones University.
' The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is the common name of the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.).
' The CBI includes both economic and military aid. See Review of the Impact and
Effectiveness of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986)
[hereinafter Review of the CBI] (statement of Sen. Anthony) (stating that aid had in-
creased from $350 million in 1982 to $1.38 billion in 1985); A. PAYNE, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN 58 (1984) (discussing increases in both economic
and military aid to the Caribbean Basin).
For references to economic aid, see Cullen, The Initiative That Wasn't: No 'Mar-
ketplace Magic'for the Caribbean Basin, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1986, at 44 (the Reagan
Administration has spent over $1 billion in economic aid to Caribbean nations since
CBI's inception); O'Reilly, Puerto Rico Offers Funds for CBI, J. Com., Feb. 11, 1985,
at 5A, col. 3 (estimating total economic aid to Caribbean Basin nations in 1985 at $1.24
billion); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAR-
IBBEAN: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY: REPORT FOR
THE SUBCOMM. ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter ENGLISH-
SPEAKING CARIBBEAN] (stating that aid to the Eastern Caribbean had risen from $10
million to $50 million over a few years).
Military aid to the Caribbean Basin includes military equipment, money, advice,
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the CBI include increased economic aid to the region,5 duty-free treat-
ment of most exports from the Caribbean Basin to the United States,6
and tax benefits.'
Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code8 (section 936) was
designed to strengthen the economy of Puerto Rico, once considered the
"poorhouse of the Caribbean."' The main provision of section 936
gives a federal tax credit to United States corporations which actively
conduct trade or business in Puerto Rico, sell or exchange substantially
all assets in the trade or business, or invest funds from such trade or
business in Puerto Rico.10 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has extended
the availability of this tax credit to the United States Virgin Islands."
In addition, the new tax law permits Puerto Rico to provide annually
and, in some circumstances, military personnel serving as advisors. Erisman, Contempo-
rary Challenges Confronting U.S. Caribbean Policy, in THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE:
U.S. POLICY IN A VOLATILE REGION 3, 18 (H. Erisman ed. 1984) [hereinafter THE
CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE]; see also Pastor, Sinking in the Caribbean Basin, 60 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 1038, 1044 (1982); Tiryakian, The Military and Security Dimensions of
U.S. Caribbean Policy, in THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE, supra, at 48. Emergency
economic and military aid packages to the Caribbean Basin increased total aid to the
region to $825 million in 1982. Boodhoo, The Economic Dimension of U.S. Caribbean
Policy, in THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE, supra, at 72, 88.
3 See CBERA, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 211-218, 97 Stat. 384, 384-95 (1983) (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 2701-2705 (Supp. 1985)).
" For an overview of various private investment incentives enhanced by the CBI,
see Clasen, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and its Implications for For-
eign Private Investment, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 741-47 (1984). Private
investment incentives necessarily include introducing technology to the region and em-
ploying local people. See ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 18; Pastor,
supra note 2, at 1039.
5 See supra note 2.
8 CBERA, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 211-218, 97 Stat. 384, 384-95 (1983) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 2701-2705 (Supp. 1985)); see also U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, 1987 GUIDEBOOK: CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE 1 (1986)
[hereinafter GUIDEBOOK] ("The centerpiece of the CBI is an innovative one-way free
trade area providing customs duty-free access to the U.S. market for 12 years for most
categories of products exported from Caribbean Basin countries.").
CBERA, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 221-223, 97 Stat. 384, 395-97 (1983) (codified
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 274(h)(6), 7652(c) (Supp. 1985)).
26 U.S.C.A. § 936 (West 1987).
9 See Comprehensive Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Part 6 of 9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4976 (1986) [hereinafter Comprehensive
Tax Reform, Part 6] (statement of Hon. Jaime B. Fuster, Resident Comm'r of Puerto
Rico).
10 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(a)(1) (West 1987); see also Feinschreiber, Passive Income
in the U.S. Possessions, 9 INT'L TAX J. 27, 28 (1982-1983); see infra notes 90-93, 98-
105 and accompanying text.
"I Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1275(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2598 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(1) (West 1987)).
American Samoa also receives the § 936 tax credit, and its leaders lobbied vigor-
ously to retain this section in the 1986 Act to protect American Samoa's only industry,
tuna canning. See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4913 (state-
ment of Hon. Fofo I. F. Sunia, Delegate in Congress from American Samoa).
[Vol. 9:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss4/5
CBI AND SECTION 936
$100 million of section 936 funds, which are kept on deposit in Puerto
Rican development banks, for financing investments in other Caribbean
Basin countries.1 2
Despite the apparent United States support for Caribbean devel-
opment, Caribbean Basin nations continue to struggle with a multitude
of political and economic problems. The CBI, despite its good inten-
tions, has often failed to provide the proper incentives for Caribbean
economic growth,"3 and Congress has threatened to repeal section 936
twice in the last five years because of United States industries' abuse of
the credit. 4 Moreover, economic problems with trade and investment
programs in the Caribbean Basin and Puerto Rico often lead to politi-
cal turmoil; therefore, economic problems must be addressed first in
order to ensure a stable political environment.
The section 936 investment incentives to Caribbean Basin nations,
coupled with Puerto Rico's Twin Plant Program,' 5 attempt to solve
some of the region's economic problems by assisting Caribbean nations
in setting up complementary operations and joint ventures. These pro-
grams also attempt to give Puerto Rico some autonomy by allowing it
to release funds to finance development projects in and act as a "big
brother" to fellow Caribbean nations. Although the programs are well
intentioned and likely to attract business to the Caribbean, many deep-
seated problems still remain which the investment incentives cannot
solve. In some Caribbean nations, political instability and lack of infra-
structure continue to restrict economic progress. Although Puerto Rico
is far ahead of its Caribbean neighbors in terms of economic develop-
12 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(c)(4), 100 Stat. 2085,
2562 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(4) (West 1987)); see SuBcoMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESs., RE-
PORT ON THE COMM. DELEGATION MISSION TO THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
INITIATIVE 4-5 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter DELEGATION MISSION REPORT];
Puerto Rico: All About Tax Breaks, ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 1986, at 20 [hereinafter
Tax Breaks]; Wylie, Production Sharing in the Caribbean Basin, Bus. AM., July 22,
1985, at 3; see also infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
13 Cullen, supra note 2, at 44.
14 See 128 CONG. REC. 17,227 (1982) (concerning proposed repeal in 1982);
Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, in
Fed. Taxes (P-H), Bull. No. 52, vol. 2, at 327 (Nov. 1984) (concerning proposed re-
peal in 1984-85); The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness,
Growth, and Simplicity, in Oil & Gas Taxes Natural Resources (P-H), Bull. No. 5, at
307 (May 1985) [hereinafter President's Tax Proposals]; see also Puerto Rico's Gover-
nor Lobbies Against Repeal of Possessions Tax Credit, 25 TAx NOTES, Dec. 17, 1984,
at 1061 [hereinafter Governor Lobbies Against Repeal]; Sheppard, Puerto Rico Lobbies
to Preserve Possessions Tax Credit, 26 TAX NOTES, Mar. 18, 1985, at 1074; Timber-
lake, Pearlman Defends Proposal to Replace Possessions Tax Credit with Wage
Credit, 26 TAX NOTES, Mar. 25, 1985, at 1184.
15 See infra Section 3.2.2.
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ment, it still suffers serious ill effects from poverty and unemployment.
Furthermore, section 936 has made Puerto Rico economically depen-
dent on the United States. As a result, other Caribbean nations, al-
though eager to accept Puerto Rican aid, fear that adopting the Puerto
Rican model of development could make them similarly dependent on
the United States. I"
This Comment considers the effect of both the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and section 936 on Puerto Rico and Caribbean Basin nations.
Section 2 examines the origins of the CBI and explains its provisions.
Section 3 investigates the historical background of section 936 and dis-
cusses its current application. Section 4 analyzes the possible effects of
amended section 936 on the Caribbean Basin and investigates recent
congressional efforts to improve the CBI. Section 5 examines the impact
of section 936 on Puerto Rico and concludes that the continued exis-
tence of section 936 fosters Puerto Rican economic and political depen-
dence on the United States. Section 6 suggests ways to improve Puerto
Rico's economic and political status so that Puerto Rico may remain a
leader of Caribbean Basin development.
2. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
2.1. The Historical Perspective
The Caribbean Basin comprises all of the islands in the Caribbean
Sea, as well as the Central American and some South American na-
tions." This region has historically been dominated by European colo-
nial powers."" The languages of the small countries reflect Spanish,
"8 Braveboy-Wagner, The Politics of Developmentalism: U.S. Policy Toward Ja-
maica, in THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 160, 166-67.
17 ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 2 ("[T]he Caribbean
stretches from Belize in Central America in an arc through Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, and then on through the smaller islands of the
Eastern Caribbean and on to Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana in South
America."). For statistics on the size, population, and Gross National Product of Car-
ibbean Basin nations, see id. at 4-5; GuIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 19-37; A. PAYNE,
supra note 2, at 167-70. The concept of a "Caribbean Basin" exists for two reasons:
(1) the problems of development in these countries are similar and interrelated, and (2)
the countries of the region pose a similar challenge to the United States in its develop-
ment of a coherent policy toward the region. Pastor, supra note 2, at 1040. But see
Lowenthal, The Insular Caribbean as a Crucial Test for U.S. Policy, in THE CARIB-
BEAN CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 183, 195 (stating that it is unrealistic to lump the
Caribbean islands with Central America because of their historical and cultural
differences).
" The Spanish-speaking countries of the region include the Central American
countries, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic; Haiti is predominantly
French, and the Netherlands Antilles are Dutch, with the remaining nations predomi-
nantly English. For a history of the colonization of the Caribbean Basin, see E. WIL-
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English, French, and Dutch influence in the early colonial era.19 In the
1800s and 1900s, many of the Caribbean and Central American coun-
tries, like most of their South American neighbors, gained their inde-
pendence from European colonial nations.20 These European powers,
however, often continued to influence their former colonies through
language and culture.
2 '
The United States became a key player in the Caribbean Basin in
1898, during the Spanish-American War. After losing this conflict to
the United States, Spain relinquished its claim to Cuba and ceded Pu-
erto Rico 22 to the United States. s The United States later gave Cuba
its independence 4 and made Puerto Rico a United States territory, 5
and later a Commonwealth." In the early 1900s, the United States
LIAMS, FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO: THE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN (1984); see
also ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 2; GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6,
at 20 ("National languages include Spanish, French, Creole, and Dutch, but English
generally can be used to conduct business throughout the region."); Pastor, supra note
2, at 1040.
19 See A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 6.
20 See THE AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY: WEST INDIAN PERSPECTIVES xiii (D.
Lowenthal & L. Comitas eds. 1973) [hereinafter AFTERMATH]; see also Braveboy-
Wagner, supra note 16, at 166 (discussing the British colonies' attainment of indepen-
dence from England during the period 1962-1966).
21 See Lowenthal, supra note 17, at 186 ("All of the Caribbean countries . . .
bear the mark of centuries of colonial rule and of plantation societies."); see also AF-
TERMATH, supra note 20, at xiii-xv; A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 39; Odell, The Carib-
bean and the Outside World: Geopolitical Considerations, in PATTERNS OF FOREIGN
INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN 18, 21 (E. De Kadt ed. 1972) [hereinafter PATTERNS].
See generally Hall, The Ex-Colonial Society in Jamaica, in PATTERNS, supra, at 32
(discussing Britain's influence on Jamaica throughout the nineteenth and most of the
twentieth centuries); Henfrey, Foreign Influence in Guyana: The Struggle for Inde-
pendence, in PATTERNS, supra, at 49 (discussing Britain's influence on Guyana, both
before and after independence). Other essays in PATTERNS consider European influ-
ence in the French Antilles, the Dutch Caribbean, and Cuba.
22 For the history of Puerto Rico prior to 1898, see Garcia-Passalacqua, Inter-
twined Futures: Puerto Rico, the United States, the Caribbean Basin, and Central
America, 9 FLETCHER F. 269, 270-72 (1985); Tansill, Puerto Rico: Independence or
Statehood?, 41 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO Rico [REV. COL.
AB. P.R.] 79, 79-83 (1980).
2 Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754,
1755, T.S. No. 343. See J. N. CORTADA & J. W. CORTADA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE CARIBBEAN, CUBA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA 41 (1985); L. LANGLEY, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (rev. ed.
1985); Geyls, The Territorial Status of Puerto Rico and Its Effects on the Political
Future of the Island, 11 REVISTA JURfDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA
DE PUERTO RICO [REV. JUR. U.I.P.R.] 385, 407 (1977).
2 Although Cuba gained its independence in 1902, from 1902 to 1909 it was a
protectorate of the United States. J. N. CORTADA & J. W. CORTADA, supra note 23,
at 69; L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 38.
25 See Tansill, supra note 22, at 84.
26 See infra note 245 and accompanying text; see also Tansill, supra note 22, at
91-93.
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became more involved in the Caribbean Basin by building the Panama
Canal and setting up the Canal Zone in Panama as a United States
possession. United States holdings in the Caribbean Basin presently
include the possessions of Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin
Islands,28 the Panama Canal Zone,2" and a naval base at Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba.30
In the twentieth century, the Caribbean and Central American na-
tions have been plagued by political and economic problems. In Cuba,
the government changed from democracy to military dictatorship to
communist dictatorship under Fidel Castro.3 Other countries, such as
Haiti, 2 Guatemala,33 and Nicaragua, 4 have suffered under oppressive
regimes. Only a few Caribbean Basin nations have had politically sta-
ble governments.35
Economically, Latin American nations have suffered acutely from
increasing population levels,3" dependence upon the production of a few
27 The Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, art. II,
33 Stat. 2234, 2234-35, T.S. No. 431 (repealed in Panama Canal Treaty, discussed
infra note 29). See generally L. Langley, supra note 23, at 30 (discussing the historical
background of the Panama Canal).
28 See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1039.
29 To be ceded back to Panama "at noon, Panama time, December 31, 1999."
Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, art. II, T.I.A.S. No.
10,030, at 12. For a discussion of the historical background to the Panama Canal
Treaty, see L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 277-82.
'o See Lowenthal, supra note 17, at 189; 131 CONG. REC. E2168 (daily ed. May
14, 1985). The United States also has a military test center in the Bahamas. A. PAYNE,
supra note 2, at 37.
31 See generally L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 211-33 (discussing the back-
ground of the Cuban Revolution, the collapse of the Batista regime and Castro's rise to
power, the Bay of Pigs incident, and the Cuban missile crisis).
32 Haiti's political problems in the twentieth century date back as far as 1915. Id.
at 72. Political problems reappeared in the late 1940s, and continued under the
Duvaliers. Id. at 235.
33 Jacobo Arbenz's leftist government was considered a viable communist threat in
1954. Id. at 205-10. Moreover, "since 1978 Guatemala has ranked consistently among
the governments most notorious for state terrorism." Id. at 289. See generally Hayes,
Coping with Problems that Have No Solutions: Political Change in El Salvador and
Guatemala, in CONFRONTATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SURVIVAL 13 (A. Adelman & R. Read-
ing eds. 1984) [hereinafter CONFRONTATION].
3" Nicaragua was plagued with civil wars from 1926 to 1933. L. LANGLEY, supra
note 23, at 117-24. Its political problems continued under the Somoza regime, and led
to the fall of Somoza and the Sandinista victory. Id. at 203-05, 282-86.
35 See Adelman, Introduction, in CONFRONTATION, supra note 33, at 3; Harri-
son, U.S. Economic Aid Policy in Central America, 8 FLETCHER F. 33, 38-39. See
generally L. LANGLEY, supra note 23 (describing the history of the Caribbean in the
twentieth century).
3' Pastor, supra note 2, at 1041; see Comment, The Caribbean Basin Initiative
and U.S. Countervailing Duty Law: One Man's Development Incentive May Be An-
other's Export Subsidy, 6 J.L. & COM. 253, 256 (1986).
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export commodities which are tied to the volatile world market, 7 un-
employment, 8 and poverty.39 Because most of the Caribbean islands
and Central American countries are small and unable to produce basic
agricultural crops, they also must import vast quantities of food. This
heavy importation leads to substantial trade deficits.40
The United States first began giving aid to struggling Caribbean
Basin nations during World War 1H.41 This aid, primarily in the form
of development assistance programs, was directed principally toward
Central American nations. Its purpose was to assure a constant flow of
raw materials from the region to assist in the war effort.42 Economic
aid to the region continued after the war by means of President Tru-
man's Point IV program and the Export-Import Bank.' Motivated by
the Cuban Revolution and increasing economic turmoil in the Carib-
bean, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in 1960."'
Objectives of the Alliance included increasing economic growth in the
Caribbean, modifying the established infrastructures of Latin American
countries, and accelerating democratization in the region."5 Although
37 See infra note 55 and accompanying text; A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 9; Pastor,
supra note 2, at 1040-41.
S3 Unemployment has been a chronic problem in the Caribbean Basin, with levels
generally fluctuating around the 20% range. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra
note 2, at 33; see A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 10; Pastor, supra note 2, at 1041; see also
Will, The Struggle for Influence and Survival: The United States-Microstate Carib-
bean Interface, in COLOSSUS CHALLENGED: THE STRUGGLE FOR CARIBBEAN INFLU-
ENCE 199, 204 (H. Crisman & J. Martz eds. 1982) [hereinafter COLOSSUS CHAL-
LENGED] (discussing the seriousness of unemployment among Caribbean youth).
31 See A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 17; Erisman, Contemporary Challenges Con-
fronting U.S. Caribbean Policy, in THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3,
15.
40 The inability of Caribbean nations to produce agricultural staples is a result of
both the unsuitability of their land for agriculture and socio-political problems resulting
from agriculture's historical association with slavery. See Dilemmas of Caribbean De-
velopment: An Interview with G. Arthur Brown, 9 FLETCHER F. 255, 263 (1985)
[hereinafter Dilemmas of Caribbean Development] (stating that one of the causes of the
food import problem is that Caribbean nations do not produce and have never produced
the staples of the Caribbean diet); STAFF OF THE HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., EASTERN CARIBBEAN: REPORT OF A STAFF STUDY
MISSION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, BARBADOS AND ST.
VINCENT 12-15 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT] (dis-
cussing agricultural problems in Antigua, Dominica and St. Vincent); see also infra
notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
41 See L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 165, 179-81; Harrison, supra note 35, at
33.
42 See Harrison, supra note 35, at 33-34.
4. Under President Truman's Point IV program, the region received technical as-
sistance, particularly in health and education. Id. at 34. The Export-Import Bank did
some capital lending, principally for highways. Id.
" See L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 234; Harrison, supra note 35, at 34.
45 See Bledel, The Latin American Development Process and the New Legislative
Trends, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 329 (1980).
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the Alliance for Progress was not successful, it laid the basic ground-
work for Caribbean and Central American economic development and
increased worldwide awareness of the problems in the region. 6
The Caribbean Basin nations themselves were aware of the politi-
cal and economic problems they faced and recognized the importance of
regional integration. In 1960, the Central American Common Market41
(CACM) was formed to reduce trade barriers between member nations
and to determine common external tariffs for the rest of the world."' In
1967, several Eastern Caribbean nations founded the Caribbean Free
Trade Association (CARIFTA),49 which was replaced in 1973 by the
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM).50 The goals of both CAR-
ICOM and CACM are very similar: to create favorable trade agree-
ments between member nations and to achieve regional integration in
order to present a united front to the rest of the trading world." Al-
though political and economic problems often have made it difficult for
CACM and CARICOM to meet their goals,52 other trading groups,
having recognized the importance of regional economic cooperation,
have assisted Caribbean nations economically. 3
Regional integration is important to the development of the Carib-
bean Basin; however, economic communities alone have not been able
48 Id. at 330.
"' Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and
Charges (with Schedules) and Protocol Concerning a Central American Preferential
Tariff, Sept. 1, 1959 & Dec. 13, 1960, 454 U.N.T.S. 6542. The member nations of
CACM were Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
41 J. N. CORTADA & J. W. CORTADA, supra note 23, at 96. For problems with
CACM, see Harrison, supra note 35, at 35.
4' Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, Dec. 15, 1965,
772 U.N.T.S. 11,011. The member nations included Antigua, Barbados, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id. at 110. CARIFTA rose out of the West Indies
Federation, which dissolved in 1962. For an analysis of the rise and fall of the West
Indies Federation, see H. SPRINGER, REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST
WEST INDIES FEDERATION (1962); Barrett, The Rise and Fall of the Federation of
the West Indies, in I READINGS IN CARIBBEAN HISTORY AND ECONOMICS: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE REGION 292 (R. Delson ed. 1981); Will, supra note 38, at 199.
50 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1035.
Member nations include all the members of CARIFTA, as well as Bahamas and
Belize.
51 See L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 272; A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 138-41.
52 The economic problems of the 1970s created balance of payment problems in
most Caribbean nations, frustrating the development of CARICOM as a world market
trader. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 16.
53 This trend is recognized particularly by the provisions of the European Eco-
nomic Community's (EEC) LomE Convention of February 1975, reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 595 (1975). See O'Connell, The Caribbean Community: Economic Integration
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 35, 55-57 (1976). The
Lom6 Convention, which extends duty-free treatment to several Caribbean nations, was
renewed in December 1984 for five years. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 9.
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to solve all of the inherent problems of these nations. In the 1970s, the
price of oil rose, hurting many of the Caribbean nations which de-
pended on imported oil for manufacturing."' At the same time, demand
for staple Caribbean commodities, such as coffee, sugar, and bauxite,
was decreasing.55 This economic condition, coupled with natural disas-
ters,56 political unrest, 57 worldwide recession, 8 and high interest rates
practically halted economic growth in the Caribbean Basin and made it
very difficult for nations to pay their international debts."0 During the
late 1970s, the United States increased its aid to Caribbean and Central
American nations from under $100 million in 1975 to over $400 mil-
" The oil crisis was particularly harmful to nations of the Caribbean region be-
cause of their fragile island economies. In the early 1970s, at the time of the first oil
shock, Caribbean nations were forced to transfer their attention from increasing their
exports to simply trying to keep their national economies afloat. ENGLISH-SPEAKING
CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 10. For an analysis of all the economic and political
repercussions of the oil crisis, see A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 11-33. This discussion
points out the likelihood that economic crisis will lead to political turmoil. See infra
note 57.
The Caribbean's continued dependence on oil is adversely affected by the present
world oil glut which has led to a reduction in efforts to search for and refine oil in the
oil-rich Caribbean nations. See ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 32
(discussing Exxon's shutdown of its Aruba refining plant).
"' The economic dependence of the Caribbean region on volatile world commodi-
ties markets for export earnings is one of the main causes of its economic instability. See
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 11. The problem of decreased de-
mand for Caribbean commodities, especially bauxite, has not improved in the 1980s.
Dilemmas of Caribbean Development, supra note 40, at 256-57.
"' See, e.g., EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 40, at 4 (discussing the
havoc Hurricanes David and Frederick wreaked on the Dominican Republic in August
1979); Martin, Puerto Rico's Economy: History and Prospects, Bus. AM., Nov. 25,
1985, at 9 (discussing the October 1985 flood and landslide damage in Puerto Rico);
Will, supra note 38, at 204 (discussing the devastation of the 1980 Eastern Caribbean
banana crop by Hurricane Allen).
57 Political instability often arises from economic instability, particularly in the
Caribbean Basin. When the Dominican Republic and Jamaica removed subsidies from
commodities, riots and demonstrations broke out. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN,
supra note 2, at 12. Security threats to the region are often a by-product of economic
turmoil. See id. at 16 ("Economic insecurity . . . threatens internal security."). But see
id. at 22 (statement of Carl Stone) (claiming that disturbances are caused by political,
rather than economic hardship).
"6 Due to its reliance on a few staple exports, the Caribbean Basin depends on
foreign price stability for its economic well-being. In the late 1970s, inflation caused
prices of Caribbean exports to rise dramatically, with the result that importing coun-
tries placed restrictions on those exported goods. During this worldwide recession, the
Caribbean Basin was particularly hard hit: in the Eastern Caribbean alone, the balance
of payment deficit rose from "$80 million in 1977 to $300 million in 1981." ENGLISH-
SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 32.
6' See A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 154; Dilemmas of Caribbean Development,
supra note 40, at 260; Pastor, supra note 2, at 1041.
60 See Dilemmas of Caribbean Development, supra note 40, at 259; Pastor, supra
note 2, at 1041.
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lion in 1980.1
2.2. Provisions of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
In order to alleviate the economic problems of the region, and to
address the increasing political unrest in El Salvador,62 Nicaragua,63
and Grenada," the Reagan Administration proposed the Caribbean
Basin Initiative in 1982.65 This plan was an attempt to solve two major
problems of the region: inadequate economic development and political
instability. 66 On August 5, 1983, Congress approved legislation giving
the President authority to grant duty-free treatment to certain Carib-
bean Basin nations.67
The trade provisions of the CBI were designed to operate for
twelve years.68 The trade provisions6' are divided into two sections:
duty-free treatment on exports from CBI nations70 and tax provisions
dealing mainly with business conventions in the Caribbean Basin."
6' See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1048.
62 See Valenta, Soviet Policy and the Crisis in the Caribbean, in COLOSSUS
CHALLENGED, supra note 38, at 47, 68; Hayes, in CONFRONTATION, supra note 33, at
13.
6s See supra note 34; A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 48; Harrison, supra note 35, at
37; Sims, Revolutionary Nicaragua: Dilemmas Confronting Sandinistas and North
Americans, in CONFRONTATION, supra note 33, at 51; Valenta, supra note 62, at 63.
" Under the left-wing New Jewel Movement, Grenada was considered such a
communist threat prior to United States intervention that Grenada was almost excluded
from CBI recognition. A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 18-20, 63.
65 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; Pastor, supra note 2, at 1038-39; see
also id. at 1044 ("The well-being and security of our neighbors in this region are in
our own vital interests.").
66 See The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 192
(1981) [hereinafter Hearings on the CBI] (statement of E. T. York); Pastor, supra note
2, at 1038-39.
67 129 CONG. REC. S8580 (1983) (rollcall vote no. 157); President's Statement on
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 1037 (July 14, 1983), reprinted in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1983, at 85.
6s 19 U.S.C. § 2706 (Supp. 1985); GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 1; Pastor, supra
note 2, at 1044.
as For analysis of the CBI, see DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at
1-6; GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 3-7; A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 56-59; Clasen,
supra note 4, at 721-41; Fiszman, Foreign Investment Law: Encouragement versus
Restraint - Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 8 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 147, 174 (1985); Recent Developments: International Trade: Elimina-
tion of Tariffs on Caribbean Products - Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 25
HARV. INT'L L.J. 245 (1984) [hereinafter Recent Developments]; Travis, Will the Car-
ibbean Basin Initiative Really Work?, AM. SHIPPER, Nov. 1983, at 76.
70 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Additional portions of CBERA ad-
dressing tax issues include § 221 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7652(c) (Supp.
1985)) (providing protection for the Puerto Rican and United States Virgin Islands
rum industries by requiring the United States Treasury to pay all excise taxes on all
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These sections are preceded by a section establishing prerequisites to
becoming a CBI beneficiary country. 2
Eligible beneficiary countries include all Central American na-
tions, some South American nations, and most Caribbean nations (ex-
cluding United States possessions and Cuba).7" The CBI imposes seven
disqualifying conditions which prevent a country from being designated
a beneficiary."' The President's decision to confer beneficiary country
status may also be affected by eleven additional provisions."
Products eligible for duty-free treatment under the CBI include all
articles (1) sold in the United States, (2) of whose cost or value at least
thirty-five percent is produced in the Caribbean Basin, and (3) which
are not otherwise excluded in the CBI. 6 Items specifically excluded
rum imported into the United States into the treasuries of Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands) and § 223 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Congress any
Caribbean Basin tax havens, drug trafficking, or other illegal activity).
72 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp. 1985).
7 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b) (Supp. 1985). As of October 1986, 22 Caribbean Ba-
sin nations had achieved CBI beneficiary status: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salva-
dor, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands
Antilles, Panama, Saint-Christopher Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Trinidad and Tobago, and British Virgin Islands. Six additional nations are
eligible for CBI beneficiary status, but have not been so designated: Anguilla, Cayman
Islands, Guyana, Nicaragua, Suriname, and Turks and Caicos Islands. GUIDEBOOK,
supra note 6, at iv.
74 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(7) (Supp. 1985); see also Recent Developments, supra
note 69, at 246-47. The seven conditions which prevent a country from becoming a
beneficiary of the CBI are: (1) having trade policies which harm United States com-
merce; (2) failing to cooperate with the United States in controlling the narcotics trade;
(3) refusing to agree to extradition of United States citizens; (4) becoming a communist
country; (5) seizing ownership of the property of a United States citizen or corporation;
(6) failing to recognize arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens and corpora-
tions; and (7) infringing on broadcasts of United States copyrighted material. The first
three conditions are absolutely prohibited, while the last four may be waived if the
President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to designate
the country a beneficiary.
75 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (Supp. 1985). These 11 additional provisions include: (1)
the country's expression of a desire to become a beneficiary; (2) the economic condition
of the country; (3) the granting of fair and reasonable access to markets and resources
of that country; (4) the agreement of the country to follow accepted rules of interna-
tional trade; (5) the degree to which the country uses distortionary international trade
practices, including export subsidies and performance requirements and local content
requirements; (6) the contribution of the country's trade policies to the revitalization of
the region as a whole; (7) the country's self-help remedies to improve its economic
development; (8) the condition of workplaces in the country and rights of workers to
bargain collectively; (9) the extent to which the country's laws protect the patent, trade-
mark, and copyright rights of foreign nationals; (10) the extent to which the country's
laws prohibit the broadcasting of copyrighted material belonging to United States citi-
zens; and (11) the extent to which the country is willing to cooperate with the United
States to enforce CBI provisions.
76 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 1985). For purposes of determining the percentage
of the article's appraised cost or value, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Is-
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from duty-free treatment are textile and apparel articles,77 footwear
and leather goods, 8 tuna, 9 petroleum,"0 and watches and watch
parts.81 In addition, duty-free treatment may be suspended on Carib-
bean sugar if importation interferes with United States domestic sugar
production.
82
Subtitle B of the original CBI embodies the tax provisions that
apply to the CBI constituents.8" The major tax provision deals with the
treatment of business conventions in the Caribbean Basin.84 Under this
provision, a business can deduct the expenses of a convention held in a
Caribbean Basin country as long as (1) the CBI country has filed an
exchange-of-information agreement with the United States, and (2) the
CBI country does not by means of its tax laws discriminate against
lands are included as beneficiary countries. In addition, the 35% domestic production
requirement may be reduced by as much as 15% by any materials originating within
the United States. Id. § 2703(a)(1). The CBI country must either wholly produce the
product or substantially manufacture a new or different article ("[S]imple combining or
packaging operations, or . . . mere dilution with water or . . . another substance that
does not materially alter the characteristics of the article" are not eligible for duty-free
treatment.). Id. § 2703(a)(2)(A)-(B); see The Caribbean Basin Initiative and U.S. Mi-
nority Participation: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on International Economic Pol-
icy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985) [hereinafter CBI and U.S. Minority Participa-
tion]; see also 131 CONG. REc. S2507 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Dole) (stating that simply dehydrating one substance to produce ethanol should not
qualify the product for duty-free treatment).
77 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1) (Supp. 1985); see also infra notes 173-76 and accom-
panying text.
78 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (Supp. 1985).
7 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(3) (Supp. 1985). Tuna was excluded to protect the tuna
industries in Puerto Rico and American Samoa. See Clasen, supra note 4, at 732.
80 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(4) (Supp. 1985). Oil was excluded primarily because
duty-free treatment of oil would probably not benefit CBI countries; rather, it would
only benefit United States oil companies which already possess refineries in the Carib-
bean. See Clasen, supra note 4, at 732-33.
81 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(5) (Supp. 1985). This restriction only applies if the watch
contains any material manufactured in a communist country. See Clasen, supra note 4,
at 733.
82 19 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (Supp. 1985); see also Clasen, supra note 4, at 733-34;
Pastor, supra note 2, at 1046 ("[T]he Administration proposed to give sugar producers
[in the Caribbean Basin] a slight preference over other foreign exporters, but not so
much as to [allow them to] compete equally with U.S. sugar growers.").
83 During CBI negotiations, the President and Treasury Department considered
many tax incentives, including a five-year investment tax credit. Details Still Lacking
on Caribbean Tax Incentive, 14 TAX NOTES, Mar. 8, 1982, at 640; Field, Treasury
Spells Out New Caribbean Tax Incentives, 14 TAx NOTES, Mar. 22, 1982, at 774.
Other incentives considered included wage subsidies and tax sparing. Id. at 776 ("Tax
sparing allows a credit against domestic taxes for taxes an investor is spared from pay-
ing when a foreign country reduces or waives tax liabilities as an investment incen-
tive."). These proposals, however, failed in Congress.
26 U.S.C. § 274(h)(6) (Supp. 1985).
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conventions held within the United States.85
In addition to the trade provisions, the United States increased its
economic and military aid to the region; in 1982, Congress approved
emergency aid of $350 million for both private investment and public
development projects,86 and such aid has increased annually since that
time. Other provisions of the CBI include special access to United
States markets for some CBI apparel manufacturers and enlarged ac-
cess to the United States government procurement market.8 7 Increased
aid to CBI countries to improve development and infrastructures, cou-
pled with the attractiveness of duty-free trade, were expected to attract
United States investment to the region.88
3. THE POSSESSIONS TAX CREDIT
3.1. Historical Background
United States possessions first received preferential tax treatment
under the Revenue Act of 1921.89 In 1948, Puerto Rico improved tax
incentives for investment on the island by coupling federal tax exemp-
tion on United States corporations90 with various Puerto Rican tax ex-
emptions.9" This program, known as "Operation Bootstrap,"9 made
85 26 U.S.C. § 274(h)(6)(A) (Supp. 1985). The purpose of exchange-of-informa-
tion agreements is to force Caribbean nations such as the Bahamas to choose between
the benefits of the CBI and traditional benefits derived from operating as tax havens for
United States citizens. See Field, supra note 83, at 775.
ss See supra note 2; see also Braveboy-Wagner, supra note 16, at 168.
s Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 24-26; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6,
at 1. The special access for textile manufacturers is greater if the apparel is made from
material manufactured and cut in the United States. Review of the CBI, supra note 2,
at 25. For a discussion concerning ways to improve the government procurement con-
cept, see id. at 488-89 (statement of B. Zagaris and C.G. Papanizas).
88 Hearings on the CBI, supra note 66, at 207-09.
89 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 314. This Act was passed
primarily to aid the Philippines in its pre-independence days. See Comment, Puerto
Rico's Possessions Corporations: Do the TEFRA Amendments Go Too Far?, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 531, 533. For a general analysis of § 936, see Costas Elena, I.R.C.
Section 936 and Fomento Income Tax Exemptions in Puerto Rico (pts. 1-4), 40 REv.
COL. AB. P.R. 563 (1979), 41 REv. COL. AB. P.R. 101, 225 (1980), 42 REV. COL. AB.
P.R. 611 (1981).
80 Section 936 and its predecessor, § 931, differ from most other Internal Revenue
Service treatment of foreign income in that § 936 grants a credit equal to the tax attrib-
utable to the possessions corporation. Posessions corporations are almost always subsid-
iaries of multinational corporations, which can achieve compliance with § 936 by care-
ful tax planning. See Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 577. Therefore, rather than
using tax credits to offset taxes paid in other countries, § 936 in effect reduces tax on
that income to zero. See id. at 587 ("For this reason the tax sparing of I.R.C. section
936(a) is highly abnormal."); Romero, CBI Not Likely to Benefit from Section 936, 30
TAX NOTES, Feb. 10, 1986, at 547 (calling § 936 a "phantom tax credit").
91 Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1948, No. 184, 1948 P.R. Laws 482 (expired
1962). This law was amended by the Puerto Rico Industrial Incentive Act of 1954, No.
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Puerto Rico a model for Caribbean development. This tax break re-
sulted in a surge of United States corporations investing capital"3 and
building manufacturing plants in Puerto Rico, particularly in labor-
intensive industries. 94 Puerto Rico continued to reap the benefits of
United States investment throughout the 1950s and 1960s.95
In the early 1970s, however, it became apparent that the Posses-
sions Tax Credit needed to be greatly revised in order for Puerto Rico
to receive any further economic benefit from its preferential tax treat-
ment. United States corporations were investing the profits from the
possessions tax deduction in foreign banks rather than in Puerto Rican
banks.9" This deprived Puerto Rico of the capital it needed to improve
its infrastructure and to undertake domestic investment. In addition,
because possessions corporations could not repatriate income to their
United States parent corporations and continue to receive benefits
under section 936, these parent corporations had an incentive to liqui-
date their possessions subsidiaries rather than to continue operations in
Puerto Rico.
97
6, 1954 P.R. Laws 12 (codified as amended at P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, §§ 241-251
(1978)) and again by the Puerto Rico Industrial Incentive Act of 1963, No. 57, 1963
P.R. Laws 120 (codified as amended at P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, §§ 252-252j (1978)).
The law currently effective in Puerto Rico is the Industrial Incentives Act of 1978, No.
26, 1978 P.R. Laws 55 (codified as amended at P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, §§ 255-255n
(Supp. 1986)). This law will remain in effect until June 30, 1988. Id. § 255m.
92 "Operation Bootstrap" was conceived by Puerto Rican Governor Luis Mufioz
Marin. The program promised United States corporations "cheap labor, exemptions
from island taxes for up to 25 years (along with total exemption from Federal corpo-
rate and private income taxes), and assistance in the building of plants." Tansill, supra
note 22, at 93; see also 128 CONG. REc. S8800 (1982) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
For a history of Puerto Rico since Operation Bootstrap, see Martin, supra note 56, at
7.
" In essence, section 936 companies elect to receive the tax benefits of § 936 while
voluntarily renouncing other relatively minor benefits under the Internal Revenue
Code. See Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 583 & n.137.
" See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 5007; Comment,
supra note 89, at 538 (stating that most section 936 companies between 1947 and 1972
were "petroleum refining, petrochemicals, plastics, textiles, and apparel" enterprises).
" Real GNP in Puerto Rico grew by average yearly rates of 5.3% and 7.0% in
the 1950s and 1960s respectively, compared to average real GNP growth in the United
States of 3.7% for the 20 year period. Martin, supra note 56, at 7; Rivera, Beyond
Section 936: A Suggested Departure from Tax-Sheltered Stagnation in Puerto Rico,
47 REV. COL. AB. P.R. 143, 146 (1986). Puerto Rico also made great strides in "edu-
cation, health, housing, public works, and other areas." Id.
" Boletin Economico, La Seccion 936 Del Codigo de Rentas Internas Federal y
su Impacto en la Economia de Puerto Rico (Primera Parte) 47 (Oct. 1980) (stating
that approximately $3 billion of § 936 funds had been invested outside Puerto Rico,
primarily in the Eurodollar market); Comment, supra note 89, at 535-36. Under tax
provisions that were effective during the early 1970s, this income was exempt from
both Puerto Rican and United States tax. Id.
9' See Comment, supra note 89, at 536.
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In response to these problems, Congress passed section 936 in the
Tax Act of 1976."1 By giving preferential treatment only to "qualified
possession source investment income" (QPSII), this provision increased
the likelihood that United States corporations would invest their income
in Puerto Rican banks.99 QPSII is defined as passive investment in-
come derived from the active conduct of a trade or business that is lo-
cated in the possession. 0" Under the 1976 Act, income derived from
QPSII could equal up to fifty percent of the total income of the section
936 company.10 1 QPSII could be deposited in Puerto Rican banks,
where, if it met the requirements for QPSII in both section 936 and
Puerto Rican tax law, this income would draw tax-free interest.102 The
banks could then use these funds to finance development in the Com-
monwealth.103 The 1976 Act also changed the form of the Puerto Rican
"' Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1520, 1643-47
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 936 (1982)). Under § 936, a tax credit is awarded
to United States corporations, if, for a three-year period, at least 80% of the gross
income of the corporation is derived from sources within Puerto Rico, and at least 50%
of the gross income is derived from the active conduct of a trade or business in Puerto
Rico. 26 U.S.C. § 936(a)(2) (1982). For a general discussion of § 936 after the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, see Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 574-84.
99 26 U.S.C. § 936(a)(1), (d)(2) (1982). Under § 936, possessions corporations
could no longer receive tax-free interest on income invested outside of Puerto Rico. See
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part I1, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1301 (1986) [hereinafter Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part II1]
(stating that the 1976 amendments to § 936 resulted in an influx of § 936 funds into
Puerto Rico which had been invested abroad in the Eurodollar market).
100 26 U.S.C. § 936(d)(2) (1982); see Costas Elena, pt. 2, supra note 89, at 106
("Qualified possession source investment income thus has 1) a possession source, 2) a
possession use, 3) an established connection between such source and use within the
same possession, and 4) a federal supervisor.").
101 26 U.S.C. § 936(a)(1) (1982). A section 936 company is a subsidiary of a
United States corporation set up in Puerto Rico designed to take advantage of the sec-
tion 936 tax advantages.
101 Interest on funds derived from QPSII remains tax-exempt only as long as the
funds are reinvested in eligible activities in Puerto Rico. 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(4)(A)
(West 1987); see Rublin, Comeback in the Caribbean: Puerto Rico's Back in Business,
Barrons, Feb. 10, 1986, at 6, reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. E658 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1986); see also Puerto Rico and the Section 936 Tax Incentives: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-68 (1982) (statement of Carmen
A. Culpeper, Sec'y of the Treas. of Puerto Rico) [hereinafter Culpeper] (discussing the
investment of QPSII in eligible local activities). For a list of eligible activities, see Bole-
tin Economico, supra note 96, at 48-50. However, income from tax-exempt investments
(such as municipal bonds) does not come into the calculation for QPSII and therefore
remains tax exempt even though not invested in eligible activities. See Costas Elena, pt.
1, supra note 89, at 576-77 (discussing Puerto Rican companies investing in Guam
bonds).
10' See Boletin Economico, supra note 96, at 48 (discussing Puerto Rican incen-
tives for section 936 corporations to reinvest their profits in the island). But see Costas
Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 571 (stating that § 936 has not been effective in lower-
ing interest rates in Puerto Rico and that § 936 funds have not been accessible to the
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tax break from a tax exemption to a tax credit,104 and permitted a full
dividends-received deduction on possessions income repatriated to a
United States parent company.
1 0 5
During the 1970s, a change took place in the composition of
United States corporations investing in Puerto Rico. As a result of in-
creasing costs of production in Puerto Rico, the composition shifted
from labor-intensive manufacturing operations to capital-intensive,
high-tech industries, particularly pharmaceuticals and electronics.10
This shift resulted in increased demand for skilled labor in Puerto Rico
and decreased demand for low-wage, unskilled labor.10
In the early 1980s, partly as a result of the increase in high-tech
industries' attraction to Puerto Rico, many members of Congress advo-
cated drastic changes in section 936.08 High-tech industries are re-
search oriented, with competitive advantages going to corporations
which develop new medical and scientific breakthroughs. During this
period, United States pharmaceutical corporations were conducting re-
search in the United States, receiving a tax deduction for research and
development expenses incurred,0 9 and then sending the patented
average Puerto Rican borrower). The duration of § 936 deposits is generally short;
approximately 70% bear maturities of 90 days or less. See Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Part III, supra note 99, at 1303. This short-term approach to § 936 deposits is a result
primarily of the uncertainty surrounding § 936 and the depositors' reluctance to com-
mit long-term funds to an uncertain provision. See Culpeper, supra note 102, at 65-66.
104 26 U.S.C. § 936(a)(1) (1982); see Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 574
(stating that although the law changed § 936 from a tax exemption to a tax credit, the
result was the same). In essence, this tax credit allows a section 936 corporation "a
federal income tax credit for taxes which it has never paid." Id. at 585 (emphasis in
original).
105 26 U.S.C. § 243(b) (1982).
106 See Comment, supra note 89, at 539 (stating that the shift in composition was
due partially to changes in world economic conditions and partially to increased costs of
production in Puerto Rico). This shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industry
resulted partly from the imposition of minimum wage laws on Puerto Rico, and partly
from the increased skill and education levels of Puerto Rican workers. See Comprehen-
sive Tax Reform, Part 9 of 9, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9103 (1985) [hereinafter Comprehensive Tax Reform,
Part 9]; 131 CONG. REC. 52536 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1985) (speech by Sen. Wallop). It
is interesting to note that American Samoa, another United States possession protected
by § 936, did not experience a shift away from labor-intensive industry and still oper-
ates as § 936 was designed. See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at
4915.
107 See Comment, supra note 89, at 538-39. The decrease in demand for low-
wage, unskilled labor is also partly attributable to the impact of federal statutes and
programs in Puerto Rico, including minimum wage laws, unemployment compensation,
and food stamps. Id.
108 128 CONG. REC. 17,233-37 (1982) (statement of Sen. Dole) [hereinafter State-
ment of Sen. Dole]; see also REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE ON H. R.
4961, S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1, 155 (1982).
109 26 U.S.C. § 174 (1982); see also 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1982) (allowing a research
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processes to their Puerto Rican subsidiaries and receiving a tax credit
for all profits derived from the United States-developed processes.11
This practice, which was common among pharmaceutical corpora-
tions,"' took advantage of a major loophole in section 936.112
Instead of repealing section 936, Congress amended it in the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 1 The
amendments to section 936 under TEFRA were designed to make it
much more difficult for United States corporations to transfer patented
processes to Puerto Rican subsidiaries tax free.11 4 In addition, the
amount of QPSII allowed tax-free treatment was reduced from fifty
percent to thirty-five percent.11 5 Congress also promised Puerto Rico
that no additional changes would be made in the possessions tax credit
until TEFRA was given a chance to take effect.11
and development credit in certain instances).
11 See Statement of Sen. Dole, supra note 108, at 17,235; Comment, supra note
89, at 541; Turner, Is It Time to End Puerto Rican Tax Haven?, J. Com., July 11,
1985, at 15A, col. 1; Highley, Sec. 936 Still Spurs Industry, J. Com., June 7, 1983, at
13, col. 1.
111 Statement of Sen. Dole, supra note 108, at 17,235-35 (stating that two drug
companies had even brought the matter to court); Comment, supra note 89, at 541. In
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), the United States parent com-
pany was transferring manufacturing patents to its Puerto Rican subsidiary. The Tax
Court required that the transaction be at arms length rather than at lower pricing
levels charged within the corporate entity. See also G.D. Searle & Co., 88 T.C. 252
(1987) (parent corporation transferred both manufacturing and marketing intangibles
to its Puerto Rican subsidiary).
ha Senator Robert Dole stated, "A clearer case of having your cake and eating it,
too, has seldom existed in the U.S. tax law." Statement of Sen. Dole, supra note 108,
at 17,235. For some of these companies, the revenue loss to the United States was over
$100,000 per Puerto Rican job created. Id.
11" Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [hereinafter TEFRA], Pub.
L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96 Stat. 324, 452-66 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 936 (1982)). The
provisions of TEFRA relating to § 936 were a joint effort by Puerto Rican leaders and
United States Treasury officials.
114 26 U.S.C. § 936(h) (1982) (tax treatment of intangible income). Subsection
936(h) gives section 936 companies two methods by which possessions corporations
could elect out of being taxed on transfers of intangible property to Puerto Rican sub-
sidiaries: (1) the cost-sharing method, which allows a possessions corporation to treat
intangible income as received in Puerto Rico if it makes a payment to its United States
affiliate for its share of research and development expenses, and (2) the profit split
method, which requires that taxable income from intangible property be apportioned
among affiliates on a product-by-product basis. For a detailed discussion of TEFRA
and § 936, see Comment, supra note 89, at 543-58. For examples of how the § 936
TEFRA Amendments work, see Nordberg on the Proposed Section 936(h) Regula-
tions, 17 TAx NOTES, Nov. 22, 1982, at 625.
'Is 26 U.S.C. § 936(a)(2)(B) (1982). TEFRA phased in the reduction in QPSII
by increasing the amount attributable to the active conduct of trade or business to 55%
in 1983 and to 60% in 1984. 26 U.S.C. § 936 (a)(2)(C) (1982).
116 This promise was deemed a "moral commitment" by Governor Hernindez
Col6n of Puerto Rico. Turner, supra note 110; see also Comprehensive Tax Reform,
Part 6, supra note 9, at 4983 (letter from Hon. William M. Gray, III to Hon. Jaime
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3.2. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
3.2.1. The Treasury Department's Wage Credit Proposal
In November 1984, the Treasury Department presented its recom-
mendations for a total restructuring of the Internal Revenue Code."'7
Among its recommendations, the report urged that section 936 be re-
pealed and replaced with a wage credit.1 " The Treasury Department's
rationale was that the possessions tax credit was costing the government
too much in lost revenue while possessions corporations were gaining a
windfall: the federal government lost $22,000 per Puerto Rican em-
ployee, while the average wage of each employee was only $14,210.1'
Furthermore, section 936 was susceptible to abuse, 20 was extremely
complex and difficult to administer, 2 and was not effective in increas-
ing employment in Puerto Rico.' 22 This recommendation was accepted
Fuster).
117 Treasury Department, supra note 14.
118 Id. at 328.
" Id. at 328; Turner, supra note 110; see also Sheppard, supra note 14, at
1075. "I.R.C. section 936 is among the ten highest corporate tax expenditures in the
Internal Revenue Code." Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 564. Costas Elena
further states that "[b]y 1983 I.R.C. section 936 will cost the United States in income
taxes lost every year an estimated $1,076,000,000 . . . .[The system of § 936 and
Puerto Rican tax exemptions] fails to confront directly, much less resolve, the problem
of chronically high unemployment in Puerto Rico." Id. (footnotes omitted). But see
Timberlake, supra note 14, at 1185 (quoting Ass't Treas. Sec'y Pearlman as stating
that a wage credit "may not be the answer").
120 Treasury Department, supra note 14, at 328. For a discussion of pre-1982
abuse, see Statement of Sen. Dole, supra note 108, at 17,235; see also Costas Elena, pt.
1, supra note 89, at 565 (discussing profit-shifting through the dividends-received de-
duction of 26 U.S.C. § 243 (1982)). At the time of the proposed repeal of § 936 in
1984, many § 936 companies were continuing to abuse their credits. See Comprehensive
Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 5005. Costas Elena also asserts that § 936 is
subject to abuse not only by United States corporations, but also by government agen-
cies administering the exemptions. Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 567 ("The
Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico cannot and will not impartially
regulate the possessions corporations.").
121 Treasury Department, supra note 14, at 328; see Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra
note 89, at 566 ("Neither the United States nor Puerto Rico has gathered systematic
and authoritative information on the financial legerdemains of the possession corpora-
tions." As much as $500 million of section 936 companies' exempt profits remain "un-
accounted for" by tax authorities.). But see Ture, Treasury Prepares a Caribbean Aus-
terity Initiative, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. E1486 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (stating
that the complexity of § 936 is largely the Treasury Department's fault, and outright
repeal is not the way to simplify its complex application).
122 Treasury Department, supra note 14, at 328. The main purpose of § 936 has
been to encourage job creation in Puerto Rico by United States investors. Sheppard,
supra note 14, at 1075. Under present law, however, the mechanics of § 936(h) allow
most section 936 corporations to obtain the tax benefit by making only minimal efforts.
Id.; see Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 563; see also id. at 564 (stating that
under § 936 (citing Puerto Rican government studies) unemployment in Puerto Rico
has always been above 10%, and was 16.5% in April 1978, "higher than the 15%
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by the President and sent to Congress in May 1985.123
While congressional committees discussed provisions of the new
tax law, various groups lobbied intensively for the retention of section
936. This lobbying was done particularly by the Government of Puerto
Rico12 and by United States companies conducting business in and
currently located in Puerto Rico. 25 Puerto Rican lobbyists vigorously
opposed the wage credit, arguing that it would not be as effective as the
Possessions Tax Credit in attracting United States investment.1 2 6 Sup-
porters of section 936 also denounced the wage credit because Puerto
Rico was competing for jobs not against the states, but against foreign
countries. Producers in these foreign countries enjoyed comparatively
low production costs because, unlike their Puerto Rican counterparts,
they were not subject to United States minimum wage laws, union de-
unemployment of 1940"); id. at 569 (stating that section 936 corporations never pro-
vided the employment that they promised in their petitions for Puerto Rican tax ex-
emption). But see Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 5001 (describ-
ing Puerto Rico's pre-section 936 unemployment rate of 47.5%).
123 President's Tax Proposals, supra note 14, at 307.
14 See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4975 (statement of
Hon. Jaime B. Fuster, Resident Comm'r of Puerto Rico); id. at 4987 (statement of
Hon. Rafael Hernindez Col6n, Governor of Puerto Rico); id. at 4990 (statement of
Antonio J. Colorado, Administrator, Economic Development Administration, Puerto
Rico); see also Governor Lobbies Against Repeal, supra note 14; Sheppard, supra note
14, at 1074 (noting Gov. Hernindez Col6n's statement, which was made while lobby-
ing Treas. Sec'y Baker, that the repeal of § 936 would lead to a mass exodus of United
States corporations from the island, an increase in the already high unemployment rate
and political instability). Other leaders of United States possessions also lobbied for the
retention of § 936. See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4913
(American Samoa); id. at 4928 (United States Virgin Islands).
125 At the time of the proposed repeal, 24% of Puerto Rican jobs were directly or
indirectly attributable to section 936 companies. Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6,
supra note 9, at 5025. United States groups lobbying to retain § 936 included the
Puerto Rican Manufacturers Association, id. at 5014; the Puerto Rico-U.S.A. Founda-
tion, representing 29 section 936 companies, id. at 5093; the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association, id. at 5107; the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, id. at
5157; Starkist Foods, Inc. in American Samoa, id. at 4920; and Ralston Purina Co.,
Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 9, supra note 106, at 9107. In addition to lobbying,
section 936 companies also put pressure on the Puerto Rican government by taking a
wait-and-see attitude toward continued investment and by threatening to exit Puerto
Rico if Congress repealed § 936. See Highley, Survey: Most U.S. Firms Would Exit, J.
Com., Mar. 25, 1985, at 3A, col. 4; O'Reilly, Puerto Rico Defends Tax Exemption, J.
Com., Mar. 25, 1985, at 3A, col. 3.
128 See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4988 (assertion by
Gov. Hernindez Col6n that a wage credit would drive away capital-intensive industry);
Governor Lobbies Against Repeal, supra note 14 (quoting Gov. Carlos Romero-
Barcelo of Puerto Rico to the effect that the wage credit would not work because "it
will be phased out before new companies can set up"); The Impact of a Wage Credit in
Puerto Rico, 27 TAX NOTES, May 20, 1985, at 942. See generally C. BONILLA, A
NEW, BUT NOT IMPROVED, WAGE CREDIT TO REPLACE SECTION 936 (Institute for
Research on the Economics of Taxation Rep. No. 32) (1985) (providing an in-depth
analysis of the wage credit and reasons why it should not replace § 936).
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mands, and United States shipping specifications (which require ship-
ment of goods in United States merchant ships, the most expensive in
the world)."' Finally, lobbyists maintained that repeal of section 936
would not increase tax revenue to the United States because possessions
corporations would simply reincorporate in low-tax foreign countries
and be able to defer taxation indefinitely.
128
3.2.2. Governor Hernhndez Col6n's Twin Plant Proposal
In his inaugural address in early 1985, Governor Raphael Her-
n -ndez Col6n of Puerto Rico proposed what became known as the
"Twin Plant Program.' 129 Under this proposal, Governor Hernindez
Col6n offered $700 million of section 936 funds for industrial develop-
ment in qualified CBI countries."'
The basic plan of the Twin Plant Program would enable United
States corporations to set up two plants: one in Puerto Rico, and one in
a qualified CBI beneficiary country. The plant in the CBI country
would produce the more labor-intensive aspects of the manufacturing
process, and then ship the unfinished product to Puerto Rico, where the
skilled work and capital-intensive processes would be added to the
product.' According to this scheme, the United States corporation
I 12 Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4999, 5017; Comprehen-
sive Tax Reform, Part 9, supra note 106, at 9102-03; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part
III, supra note 99, at 1318; see also Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1074 (quoting an
attorney representing Puerto Rico to the effect that the wage credit was not enough to
combat high costs associated with United States minimum wage laws and environmen-
tal restrictions). For a good discussion of how minimum wage laws were imposed in
Puerto Rico, see Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 588-96. The average wage of a
comparable employee in Puerto Rico, however, is still much lower than the minimum
wage applicable to the mainland United States, even though the cost of living in Puerto
Rico is higher than that on the mainland. See id. at 595. Although it is often claimed
that the expense of shipping on United States carriers increases the costs of production
in Puerto Rico, the cost of shipping from the island has been historically low. Id. at
596-601. Likewise, the argument of high shipping costs fails to take into account that,
in most situations, shipping costs are either born by the section 936 parent company
(on the United States mainland) or passed on to the ultimate consumer. Id. at 599.
128 See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1074.
129 Rivas, Herntndez Colbn Pulls CBI Surprise, CARIBBEAN Bus., Jan. 9, 1985,
at 1; see Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 4989 (statement of Gov.
Hernfndez Col6n).
1"0 Statement by Governor Hernindez Col6n to the Conference on Democracy for
the English-Speaking Caribbean, in Bridgetown, Barbados (Nov. 9, 1985), reprinted
in 131 CONG. REc. E5410 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1985); O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 1A, col.
2; Rivas, supra note 129, at 1. This "twin plant" idea was not new: the American
Chamber of Commerce had proposed the idea in the Dominican Republic as early as
1982. Russin & Rubin, Using Possessions Corporation Funds in the Caribbean Basin:
A Proposal, 8 INT'L TAX J. 352 (1982).
131 Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative 4 (Memorandum of May 10, 1985) (available from the
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would receive three benefits: use of low-cost labor in the Caribbean
Basin nation, duty-free importation of the unfinished product from the
CBI country into Puerto Rico, and retention of a Puerto Rican tax
credit. At the time of Governor Hernindez Col6n's proposal, twenty-
four United States corporations were already operating twin plants in
the Caribbean,1 2 and twenty-four additional corporations had pledged
to invest in twin plants if the section 936 funds became available under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.13
Puerto Rico enthusiastically implemented the program and pro-
vided funds for twin plant investments as early as May 1985.1., While
implementation was going forward in Puerto Rico, Governor Her-
nindez Col6n, Antonio Colorado (then president of the Puerto Rican
Economic Development Administration), and other Puerto Rican offi-
cials lobbied Congress and Treasury Secretary James A. Baker to in-
clude a similar provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.35 President
Reagan supported the Twin Plant Program in a February 1986 speech
delivered in Grenada.iS Thereafter, Congress agreed to retain section
936 in the 1986 Act if Governor Hernfndez Col6n would agree to free
up $100 million of restricted section 936 funds annually for investment
in CBI countries.
13 7
Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration) [hereinafter Puerto Rico and the
CBI]; see also O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 1A, col. 3; Wylie, supra note 12, at 6.
1"2 Twin Plants in Operation Now, Bus. AM., Nov. 25, 1985, at 10.
133 Dunlap, Puerto Rico Seeks Twin-Plant Investors, J. Com., Nov. 27, 1985, at
3A, col. 1; see also Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 5044.
134 First "CBI" Loan Granted by GDB, 10 P.R. Bus. REV., May-June 1985, at
1.
Ms O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 1A. The Treasury Department was at first skeptical
of the Twin Plant Program because commitments made by section 936 companies were
not binding, and there was no way to gauge how much investment the plan would
generate. The Department also wanted to see the United States take a more active role
in implementing the Twin Plant Program perhaps to the point of taking away the tax
benefits of section 936 from companies that refused to participate in the program.
Therefore, Puerto Rico and the Treasury Department were prepared to enter into an
Executive Agreement to insure that the commitments of section 936 companies would
be preserved. 131 CONG. REc. E5410 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1985) (statement of Coy. Her-
nindez Col6n); see also Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the
United States and the Government of Puerto Rico, Nov. 14, 1985, cited in THE TAx
REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-632 (1986)
[hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement].
138 Speech by President Reagan to the citizens of Grenada (Feb. 20, 1986), cited
in 131 CONG. REC. E516 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986) [hereinafter President Reagan's
Grenada speech].
17 Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 135, at 11-632; Tax Reform Act of
1986, Part III, supra note 99, at 1323; Tax Breaks, supra note 12. For information
concerning interest rates, lending limits, and repayment terms on CBI loans for twin
plants, see Government Development Bank Loan Policies for Complementary Projects
Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 10 P.R. Bus. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 8
[hereinafter Government Development Bank Loan Policies]; Mudie, GDB-CBI Incen-
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3.2.3. Provisions of Section 936 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986
In addition to the modifications to section 936 to allow funding for
CBI development projects, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made other
adjustments to past provisions. The percentage of income a possessions
corporation could attribute to QPSII was again reduced, from thirty-
five percent to twenty-five percent." 8" Furthermore, Congress amended
section 936 provisions dealing with transfers of intangibles to Puerto
Rico and the treatment of royalty payments by a possessions corpora-
tion.1 9 Finally, the definition of "possession" was expanded to include
the United States Virgin Islands. 4 °
Under the CBI investment provisions of amended section 936,
Congress will allow section 936 corporations to receive a tax credit for
QPSII invested in a qualified Caribbean Basin country as long as (1)
the investment is used to purchase active business assets or (2) the in-
vestment is in development projects in the qualified country. 4 A quali-
fied Caribbean Basin country is defined as any country which meets
the requirements of a beneficiary country under the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, including the requirements for holding tax-
exempt conventions.' 4
The Government Development Bank must specifically authorize
the use of section 936 funds for CBI investment in accordance with
regulations issued by the Puerto Rican Secretary of the Treasury."4
Furthermore, the borrower of section 936 funds must certify to the Pu-
erto Rican Secretary of the Treasury that the funds will be used
tive Loan Program, Bus. AM., Nov. 25, 1985, at 6. The bulk of the investment, how-
ever, is still expected to come from private companies participating in the Twin Plant
Program rather than from Puerto Rican government loans. Tax Breaks, supra note 12.
1"8 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(a)(2)(B) (West 1987); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Part III, supra note 99, at 1304 (testimony of Alberto M. Paracchini, President of the
Puerto Rico Bankers Association) (opposing the reduction of QPSII from 35% to 25%).
For a discussion of previous reduction, see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
-9 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 367(d)(2), 482, 936(h) (West 1987). For an analysis of intan-
gible transfers to possessions corporations after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see Aud,
Gordon, & Benson, Determining the Taxable Income of Possessions Corporations
Under Final § 936(h) Regulations, 15 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 315 (1986).
140 26 U.S.C.A. § 936 (d)(1) (West 1987). Taxation of United States Virgin Is-
lands source income had previously come under § 934A, which was repealed by the
1986 Act. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1275(c)(3), 100 Stat. 2085,
2599.
141 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(4)(A)(i) (West 1987).
142 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(4)(B) (West 1987). These requirements include filing
exchange-of-information agreements with the United States Treasury, and having no
discriminatory tax laws against conventions held in the United States. See 19 U.S.C. §
2702(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1985); 26 U.S.C.A. § 274(h)(6) (West 1987).
143 26 U.S.C.A. § 936(d)(4)(A)(i) (West 1987).
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promptly within the restrictions of the Act. 44 In addition, the borrower
must agree to let the Secretary of the Treasury examine its books to
ensure that the borrower is complying with all relevant
requirements.
145
4. IMPACT OF AMENDED SECTION 936 AND THE TWIN PLANT PRO-
GRAM ON CBI NATIONS
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Puerto Rico's Twin Plant Pro-
gram have been lauded by both United States and Caribbean leaders as
furthering the objectives of the CBI and as likely to provide the coun-
tries of the Caribbean Basin with substantial investment opportuni-
ties.1 48 Many analysts believe that amended section 936 will bolster the
faltering CBI.
147
4.1. Current Problems of CBI Nations
Despite the intention of the CBI to address regional economic
problems, complex obstacles to economic development remain; United
States investment initiatives and the Twin Plant Program will not be a
panacea for the region's deep-seated problems.1 48 Factors such as politi-
cal instability and overinvolvement of the public sector in Caribbean
development, 49 lack of infrastructure in poorer beneficiary nations,15 0
and United States protectionism15' could prevent CBI nations from
gaining any lasting benefits from funds invested under section 936. It is
necessary to analyze some of the chronic problems of Caribbean Basin
nations in order to determine the potential impact of these investment
programs.
4.1.1. The Overinvolvement of Government in the Private Sector
Two problems may develop when the public sector becomes too
144 Id. § 936(d)(4)(C)(i).
145 Id. § 936(d)(4)(C)(ii).
146 Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Hon. Clayton Yeutter,
United States Trade Representative); Seaga, A Close Look at CBI and Puerto Rico, 11
P.R. Bus. REV., Jan. 1986, at 13 (Edward Seaga is President of Jamaica.).
147 Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 329 (statement of Dr. Joseph E. Ed-
munds, Ambassador of St. Lucia to the United States); CB1 and U.S. Minority Partid-
pation, supra note 76, at 2, 86.
148 Even before passage of the CBI, many critics in the United States and the
Caribbean felt that it was unlikely that the program would have any major impact on
the "deep-rooted problems" of the Caribbean. A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 62.
149 See infra Section 4.1.1.
150 See infra Section 4.1.2.
11 See infra Section 4.1.3; see also Cullen, supra note 2, at 44.
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involved in the private sector. First, excess governmental involvement in
the private sector increases the financial burden on the already under-
financed government and makes it more likely that the small country
will have difficulty paying its international debts.' 52 Second, a small,
developing nation which aggressively involves itself in the private sector
may send out signals to foreign investors that investments placed in that
nation would be made at the risk of being subject to excess regula-
tion 5 and control,' 5" or possibly nationalization.' 5
In the weak economies of Caribbean Basin countries, economic
problems often lead to political instability. 156 Once the government
steps in to help the private sector in an economic crisis, foreign inves-
tors perceive the government's intervention as a threat to their invest-
ment interests.' 51 The cycle continues when foreign investors withdraw
their capital from the politically unstable economy; this withdrawal of
capital exacerbates the economic and political problems of the nation . 58
The Twin Plant Program will, unfortunately, have only a limited
effect on promoting political stability in the Caribbean Basin. The pro-
152 Pastor, supra note 2, at 1049. At the time of the passage of the CBI, many
Caribbean leaders criticized the program's emphasis on investment and trade rather
than on direct developmental aid. See A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 144-45 ("[T]here is
no disagreement with Washington's dictum that the region's poor countries must pull
themselves up by their own bootstraps. But first we must have the straps with which to
pull up the boots.") (quoting Vere Bird, Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda).
153 Excess regulation and governmental red tape in Caribbean nations not only
discourage foreign investors from investing in the nation, they also stifle domestic in-
dustry and entrepreneurial creativity. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2,
at 24; see also President Reagan's Grenada speech, supra note 136.
1" Jamaica's policy of "ownership and control" of business in the 1970s not only
prevented foreign merchants from investing in the country, but also drove out Jamaican
capital. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 17. See generally Ambur-
sley, Jamaica: From Michael Manley to Edward Seaga, in CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN
72 (F. Ambursley & R. Cohen eds. 1983) (discussing Manley's socialism and Seaga's
return to a capitalist model).
The risk of takeover or military coup in a Caribbean Basin nation further discour-
ages private industry from investing capital which it might never recover.
115 Guyana's nationalization of the private sector motivated foreign investors to
leave, thereby exacerbating the country's economic problems. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAR-
IBBEAN, supra note 2, at 17. See generally Thomas, State Capitalism in Guyana: An
Assessment of Burnham's Co-operative Socialist Republic, in CRISIS IN THE CARIB-
BEAN, supra note 154, at 27 (discussing Guyana's economic problems within its state
property model).
156 See supra notes 54 & 57 and accompanying text; 131 CONG. REc. E2168
(daily ed. May 14, 1985) ("[Tihe absence of economic growth, be it in Puerto Rico or
elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, will increase the vulnerability to social and political
instability.") (statement of Hon. Jaime B. Fuster).
157 ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 16-17; Dilemmas of Carib-
bean Development, supra note 40, at 262 (stating that many foreign investors depend
on local Caribbean governments to guarantee the security of their investments).
1s See supra notes 54, 57, & 156 and accompanying text.
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gram, providing only economic support, does not address the funda-
mental problem of United States investors' reluctance to invest in politi-
cally unstable Caribbean nations, and in fact can do little to encourage
investment in any particular country."' 9 While the Twin Plant Pro-
gram can help to prevent economic problems from developing into po-
litical problems, it can do little to encourage investment in countries
where political problems already exist. In most cases, therefore, the
very nations which need the most help from the private sector to over-
come political instability and unrest will receive little, if any, private
sector investment.1 60 United States investors will simply continue to
choose the most stable CBI nations in which to concentrate their
investments."'
4.1.2. Lack of Infrastructure
Many of the poorer CBI nations lack the basic infrastructure nec-
essary to support the most basic industrial processes. For example,
Dominica, a small, independent island in the Eastern Caribbean, does
not have an airport capable of handling jet aircraft; and, although
water is an abundant resource, Dominica lacks the capacity to properly
harness the water for industrial use.162 Antigua & Barbuda, another
Eastern Caribbean nation, experiences frequent energy shutdowns and
water shortages, a condition which prevents expansion of its tourism
industry and constrains manufacturing operations. s
Infrastructure problems such as these usually cannot be solved by
private investment; these nations need direct economic aid in order to
develop the basic infrastructure necessary to attract foreign invest-
ment."' Direct aid, however, often goes toward improving the most
immediate problems first, such as making interest payments on interna-
tional debt, 65 and only the small amount remaining is spent on actual
1'l The uneven distribution of present twin plants demonstrates Puerto Rico's
lack of control over the allocation of its § 936 funds. Of the 25 twin plant projects in
operation as of July 1986, 16 are located in the Dominican Republic, 5 in Haiti, 2 in
Barbados, 1 in St. Kitts, and 1 in Grenada. Puerto Rico Companies with Complemen-
tary Projects in the Caribbean, 11 P.R. Bus. REv., July 1986, at 4-5.
1 0 See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1044 ("[T]he most significant trade and invest-
ment provisions will have the least impact on those countries with the most urgent nee(;
for political stability.").
161 See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1044 (stating that the CBI's impact will be limited
to politically stable areas).
161 EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 40, at 13.
163 Id.
16, Id. at 21.
1 Countries with adequate infrastructures are unable to maintain them when
faced with seemingly insurmountable international debt payments. In Jamaica, for ex-
ample, the debt problem led to infrastructure problems such as roads not being repaired
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development.1 6 6 Often the smaller, lesser developed nations, which need
the most help, receive the smallest proportion of economic aid."'7 The
infrastructure problem thus becomes self-perpetuating: lack of infra-
structure discourages foreign corporations from investing in the coun-
try, and the resulting lack of investment prevents the country from de-
veloping its infrastructure. 6
The United States Government has recognized the infrastructure
problems in small Caribbean Basin nations and has developed several
programs to assist their economic progress.16 9 The Twin Plant Pro-
gram seeks to expand on these development efforts by giving prefer-
ences to projects which most directly support economic growth in CBI
nations.17 0 Although it is too early to tell whether Puerto Rico can have
a substantial impact on funding infrastructure projects, the Twin Plant
Program is a step in the right direction.
4.1.3. United States Protectionism of its Domestic Industry
Protectionism represents a dangerous threat to the success of the
Twin Plant Program and other investment incentives; in response to
protectionist pressure, the United States often gives benefits to CBI na-
tions with one hand and takes them away with the other. The CBI
and hospitals not being able to purchase necessary medical supplies. ENGLISH-SPEAK-
ING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 23.
,e See Cullen, supra note 2, at 44 (noting that, for example, some of the Domini-
can Republic's aid goes to Dominican street vendors to enable them to purchase their
own bicycles).
16 See A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 62-63. Moreover, smaller countries must in-
vest a higher per capita amount on basic infrastructure needs to achieve the same re-
sults as the larger nations. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 31 (state-
ment of Georges Fauriol).
16' See ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 55 ("[T]he constraint to
any kind of development is infrastructure."); A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 63 (stating
that lack of infrastructure will aggravate rather than lessen disparities between Carib-
bean nations).
169 131 CONG. REc. E378-79 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of Hon.
Dymally) (proposing the use of the Peace Corps to assist Caribbean nations in infra-
structure development projects such as water management, electrification, and road
maintenance); CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 39 (discussing
efforts to improve the infrastructures of Caribbean Basin countries through United
States governmental programs); EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 40, at 21
(discussing the use of the Peace Corps, AID and other government development organi-
zations in the Eastern Caribbean).
170 See DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 5; Government Devel-
opment Bank Loan Policies, supra note 137, at 8 ("Preference will be given to those
projects that most directly contribute to specific economic objectives, such as . . .
strengthening of infrastructure . . ... "); see also Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6,
supra note 9, at 4990 (proposal by Gov. Hernindez Col6n of Puerto Rico to use § 936
funds to build processing plants in Dominica to prevent fruit from rotting on the trees).
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trade incentive on sugar"" provides an example of congressional protec-
tionism. While granting the CBI nations duty-free treatment, Congress
continued to maintain price supports on domestic sugar in the face of
decreasing demand. Congress was then forced to cut quotas on Carib-
bean Basin sugar due to the flood of domestic sugar on the market."'
In addition to Congress' current protectionist sentiments, CBI sup-
porters blame protectionism at the time of the passage of the CBI for
its present ineffectiveness. Many CBI supporters feel that the program
cannot succeed unless excluded trade items, such as textiles, apparel,
and leather products, are given duty-free treatment.173 These items are
typically labor-intensive, and could be produced in the Caribbean Basin
at less cost than they are currently being produced in the Far East." 4
Unless CBI nations gain some sort of competitive advantage in the
world market, they will not be able to compete with the Far East.1
7 5
17. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (Supp. 1985); see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
172 See Cullen, supra note 2, at 44; see also CBI and U.S. Minority Participation,
supra note 76, at 13 (describing "widespread concern in the region about the direction
of our sugar policy"). The United States Government later determined that the quotas
could not be altered in favor of CBI sugar products without violating the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 52.
Costa Rica's floricultural market suffered a similar fate as a result of action by the
Commerce Department's International Trade Administration. DELEGATION MISSION
REPORT, supra note 12 at 16, 67; Cullen, supra note 2, at 44. For a general discussion
on the vulnerability of CBI imports to protectionist pressure, see Review of the CBI,
supra note 2, at 440-45 (statement of Craig VanGrasstek, Trade Policy Consultant).
173 CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 1, 71; ENGLISH-
SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 18; Dilemmas of Caribbean Development,
supra note 40, at 257. At the time of the passage of the CBI, 87% of Caribbean exports
were already entering the United States duty-free. A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 62. Of
the remaining 13%, approximately one-half consisted of textiles and clothing (excluded
under the CBI), and sugar (subject to a global quota system with no preferences for
CBI countries). Id. Combined with the other excluded items, the impact of the CBI on
Caribbean exports is negligible. See, e.g., Pastor, supra note 2, at 1045 (estimating that
during the first year of the CBI, the increase in exports to the United States will
amount to only one percent of existing levels); Romero, supra note 90, at 548 (stating
that in 1983 only four percent of total Caribbean exports to the United States were
eligible for concessions under the CBI). In addition, protection of domestic textile mar-
kets seems unreasonable when one realizes that Caribbean companies possess a very
small share of the textile market. See CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note
76, at 14.
The most promising application of the CBI may be in non-traditional areas. See
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 3 ("Promising areas for U.S. investment include tropical
fruits, winter vegetables, wood products, horticulture, aquaculture, food processing,
livestock, tourism, data processing . . . and export oriented light manufacturing
.... "); Braveboy-Wagner, supra note 16, at 168-69 (stating that President Reagan's
purpose in promoting the CBI was not to encourage duty-free treatment of traditional
exports, but rather to encourage Caribbean nations to develop new products for export)
(citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at A14).
174 Wylie, supra note 12, at 3-4.
175 DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-6 (stating that CBI na-
tions' exports of textiles and apparel were negligible compared to those of the Far
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Moreover, protectionist barriers imposed by governmental agencies on
Caribbean Basin nations may negate any benefits derived from the
CBI.176
The OBI is a long-range program: as discussed in Section 2.2,
duty-free treatment of CBI imports is intended to last twelve years. 1 "
Although the CBI's delicate balance was designed to prevent investment
from happening too quickly, many critics believe that too much red
tape bars the implementation of CBI incentives.1' Furthermore, an ad-
ditional surge of protectionism in Congress against CBI nations could
prevent the new investment incentives from providing any lasting eco-
nomic development.
4.1.4. Additional Problems of Development Under the CBI
CBI supporters have noted additional problems with implementing
the CBI in poorer countries. Rushing to manufacturing too fast often
results in a waste of agricultural resources.1 7 9 Where a country would
have produced its own vegetables, the CBI and the Twin Plant Pro-
gram might encourage it to invest in manufacturing; the little income
that the developing nation then earns from foreign investment must be
used to import food which it had formerly produced.1 80
Overconservatism on the part of Caribbean and United States in-
vestors also detracts from the effectiveness of the CBI. Local investors
often impose extremely high interest rates and 100% collateral require-
ments on borrowers.' The increased availability of section 936 funds,
however, is projected to drive interest rates down."8 2 The CBI nations
East).
176 See Cullen, supra note 2, at 44; see also Comment, supra note 36, at 272-76
(stating that a country's status as a CBI beneficiary country has no effect on a decision
by United States Customs to impose countervailing duties on its exports, and noting
that a steel plant in Trinidad & Tobago and a cement plant in Costa Rica were subject
to countervailing duties in spite of the conditions of the CBI).
177 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; CBI and U.S. Minority Participa-
tion, supra note 76, at 5 (stating that in 1985 the program had been operating for less
than 2 years out of the 12, and that protectionism must be avoided).
178 Field, Treasury Spells Out New Caribbean Tax Incentives, 14 TAX NOTES,
Mar. 22, 1982, at 774.
19 The decline of the agricultural sector in CBI countries has increased the flow
of migration to the United States from Caribbean countries. Workers unable to support
themselves in agriculture move first to the cities of their own countries, and, then, fail-
ing to find work there, seek to enter industrialized countries such as the United States.
See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1055.
180 See CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra, note 76, at 23. For addi-
tional problems of developing the agricultural sector of Caribbean Basin countries, see
Dilemmas of Caribbean Development, supra note 40, at 263-64.
16 See EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 40, at 21.
182 See Metzger, Financing Trade Between Puerto Rico and the CBI Region, 10
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also exhibit conservatism in production, preferring to limit themselves
to traditional commodities rather than developing new export opportu-
nities.183 Exports of traditional commodities have already declined from
1984 to 1985, while exports of non-traditional items have grown at
higher than the worldwide rate. 8" These conservative investment prac-
tices persist in spite of the grim outlook for traditional Caribbean ex-
ports for the rest of the decade. 85 United States investors also exhibit
conservatism by investing only in countries with established infrastruc-
tures and stable governments, bypassing countries that have the greatest
need for private investment. 8 Caribbean and United States investors
must shed some of their conservatism and take some risks in order for
the CBI and the Twin Plant Program to be successful.
In addition, many CBI nations continue to place restrictions on
foreign investment.1 8 7 These restrictions include tax structures which
discourage foreign investment, 88 overvalued exchange rates, 8 and in-
adequate foreign exchange for imported materials.1 90 By creating envi-
ronments hostile to foreign capital, CBI countries can produce obstacles
to Caribbean development that are as great as United States protection-
ist barriers.1 9
4.2. Improving the Effectiveness of the CBI
Congress has been aware of the CBI's shortcomings since the
CBI's inception in 1983, and has attempted to improve its effectiveness.
P.R. Bus. REv., Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 6-7 (stating that interest rates on § 936 funds are
sometimes one to two percent lower than Eurodollar rates).
183 CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 4.
I Id. at 9-10.
185 Id. at 52; see ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, sitpra note 2, at 27.
188 See supra notes 156-61 & 170 and accompanying text.
187 See CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 54; see also EN-
GLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 16 ("[Tlhe success of [foreign capital] is
predicated upon the functioning of a political system that is accommodating to foreign
capital."). But see CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 42-43 (dis-
cussing efforts by CBI countries to institute macroeconomic changes and improve for-
eign investment laws so that investment is encouraged rather than restricted).
188 CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 54. The tax rates of
Caribbean nations tend to be much higher than those of capitalist Far Eastern coun-
tries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN,
supra note 2, at 23; see also President Reagan's Grenada speech, supra note 136.
189 CBI and U.S. Minority Participation, supra note 76, at 54 ("[O]vervalued
exchange rates are the greatest single obstacle to export expansion and
diversification.").
190 Id.
191 Protectionist import substitution policies in Caribbean nations also cause local
businessmen to become unable to handle competitive markets. ENGLISH-SPEAKING
CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 27.
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In February of 1986, the House Subcommittee on Oversight of the
Committee on Ways and Means held hearings to review the impact
and effectiveness of the CBI (Hearings). 92 Many provisions of the CBI
were of great concern, particularly the problems of the Caribbean sugar
industry1 93 and the overall decline in trade from the Caribbean Basin to
the United States since the CBI's inception.194 Various options were
explored by members of the House Subcommittee, United States and
Caribbean Basin officials, and people in the private sector, to reduce
problems in the Caribbean. The section 936 investment incentives and
the Twin Plant Program were discussed in some detail.'95 Among the
proposed improvements to the CBI were expansion of the CBI to in-
clude other investing countries, such as Canada and the European
countries, the continued development of new, non-traditional exports,
expansion of duty-free treatment to restricted or exempt items, and ex-
tension of the time frame of the CBI beyond the original twelve-year
time limit.
Following these Hearings, the Subcommittee on Oversight sent a
delegation mission to five Caribbean Basin countries' 96 to determine the
progress of the CBI countries toward attaining economic development
and the role of the CBI in achieving such development. 9 " The delega-
tion mission visited the Caribbean Basin during January 10-21, 1987.
The five countries visited shared many of the same concerns. From the
trade perspective, these countries were interested in expanding the
product coverage under the CBI to include textiles, leather goods, and
tuna."9 " They also desired a reduction in sugar quotas,9 9 and expressed
fear of growing protectionism in the United States.200 From the tax
perspective, these countries were eager to receive section 936 funds to
192 Review of the CBI, supra note 2.
193 Id. at 52.
19, Id. at 65 (statement of B. Smart, Under Sec'y of Commerce). Total exports
from CBI countries to the United States declined from $9.5 billion in 1983 to $7.3
billion in 1985, a decline of 23%. The decline, however, was believed to be largely
attributable to the decline in petroleum product prices. Id.; see also DELEGATION MIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 12, at 94 (excluding oil-exporting CBI nations, total United
States imports from the Caribbean Basin during this period increased from each of the
three CBERA regions - 13.4% from Central America, 15.9% from the Central Carib-
bean, and 19.0% from the Eastern Caribbean. In the same period, however, United
States imports from the world grew by 33.8%.).
193 Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 147 (statement of Stephen E. Shay, Acting
Int'l Tax Counsel, Dept. of the Treas.).
19' Jamaica, Costa Rica, Barbados, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. DELEGA-
TION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
197 Id.
I98 d. at 13, 17, 22, 29.
199 Id. at 12, 15, 19, 21, 24.
200 Id. at 13, 16.
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enhance their developmental projects, but were reluctant to sign tax
information exchange agreements (TIEAs).201 Overall, these five coun-
tries were anxious to increase Caribbean Basin access to United States
markets 02 and to extend the coverage of the CBI beyond the initial
twelve-year period."
Based on its observations, the delegation mission made several rec-
ommendations for improving the CBI. The first recommendation was
the reaffirmation of the congressional commitment to the success of the
CBI.20 4 Moreover, the delegation recommended: (1) an extension of the
CBI beyond its 1995 expiration date,2 0 5 (2) duty-free access to articles
assembled or processed from parts made in the United States, 08 (3)
duty-free treatment of dutiable "exempt list" products where the article
is not produced or is in short supply in the United States, 07 (4) duty-
free treatment of specific amounts of "exempt list" dutiable goods ex-
ported to the United States under a "tariff rate quota" system, 20  (5)
separate injury determinations in countervailing duty and anti-dumping
unfair practice cases,209 (6) a $200 increase in the duty-free allowance
for United States citizens returning from a CBI beneficiary country, 10
and (7) the establishment of a "rule-of-origin" to provide total duty-
free treatment for products substantially transformed in the Eastern
Caribbean states. 211 The delegation also recommended that the Sub-
201 Id. at 25, 28. Of the five countries visited, Costa Rica, the Dominican Repub-
lic, and Haiti had not yet signed TIEAs. Id. at 9.
102 Id. at 14, 17, 20, 22, 26.
203 Id. at 14, 22, 26.
204 Id. at 36.
205 Id. at 37. The delegation mission recommended automatic renewal of the 12-
year period every year, effectively retaining a constant 12-year program until Congress
affirmatively acted to phase out the CBI altogether. This recommendation also sup-
ported a reporting by CBI beneficiary countries every two or three years concerning use
and promotion of the CBI, changes in government policies, and use of the tax benefits
under the CBI. Id.
206 Id. This provision would encourage production-sharing operations between
United States and Caribbean Basin industries by eliminating the duty otherwise paid
on the "value-added" portion of the item assembled in the CBI country.
207 Id. at 37-38.
108 Id. at 38-39.
209 Id. at 39-40. This provision is an attempt to solve the problem of the Costa
Rican cut flower industry. Id. at 40; see supra note 172.
21 Id. at 40. This provision would help tourism in the Caribbean Basin and en-
courage visitors to purchase goods in the region.
211 Id. at 40-41. The proposed rule of origin "allow[s] products from the Eastern
Caribbean States to enter the United States duty-free if (a) 25 percent of the value of
the product is U.S. components, and 10 percent is value-added in the Eastern Carib-
bean States; and, (b) the product is substantially transformed in the Eastern Caribbean
States." Id. at 40. Cf. CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 1985). The Eastern Carib-
bean States include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands-Antilles, St. Christo-
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committee on Trade conduct hearings to resolve a number of issues
deemed problematic by the delegation. 12 Finally, the report states the
need for more assistance for infrastructure development"' and desires
the increase of government procurement contracts to businesses in CBI
beneficiary countries.214
Based on these recommendations, a bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives to amend and improve the CBI.2 '5 This bill
generally endorsed the recommendations of the delegation mission.21 6
At the time of publication of this Comment, this bill was still in the
House Ways and Means Committee.
Although problems with the CBI remain, Congress seems firmly
committed to making the CBI work. Obstacles for Caribbean Basin ec-
onomic development have been strictly scrutinized, and solutions have
been recommended. Should the CB1 continue to receive support in the
United States Congress and from United States administrative agencies,
the Caribbean Basin is likely to continue to experience improvement in
economic development, private investment, and trade.
pher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 40-41.
212 2. Subcommittee Hearings
a. The Subcommittee on Trade should conduct hearings to reexamine
the U.S. trade policy underlying the exemption of certain items
from duty-free treatment under the CBI.
b. The Subcommittee on Trade should determine whether the tax
treatment afforded to certain U.S.-owned ethanol producers in the
Caribbean region should also be afforded to state-owned facilities in
Costa Rica and Jamaica.
c. The Subcommittee on Trade should hold hearings to determine
whether the U.S. Customs Service handling and tariff treatment of
CBI exports is consistent at each port of entry.
d. The Subcommittee on Oversight should hold hearings at the end of
1988 to provide review of loans made by the Government of Puerto
Rico with . . . QPSII funds in qualified Caribbean Basin coun-
tries. In addition, the Government of Puerto Rico should report to
the Committee on Ways and Means the results of its commitment to
provide $100 million to qualified CBI countries.
DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 41.
21 The infrastructure development should pay particular attention to the Eastern
Caribbean States, Haiti, and the Central American countries, including Belize. Id. at
44-45.
114 Id. at 46. This action is necessary because, although the Department of Com-
merce claims that the government procurement contracts are available to CBI investors,
CBI investors are uncertain as to the applicability of the terms of these contracts to
non-United States businesses.
215 H.R. 3101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
216 Id. The major exceptions include a provision for changing the termination date
for duty-free treatment from 1995 to 2007, id. § 6, and a provision for freezing the
quantity of sugar imports from beneficiary countries at levels prescribed from Septem-
ber 26, 1983, to September 30, 1984. Id. § 10.
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5. IMPACT OF AMENDED SECTION 936 AND THE TWIN PLANT PRO-
GRAM ON PUERTO Rico
Although the investment produced by section 936 provides few
jobs for Puerto Rican workers, most Puerto Ricans believe their eco-
nomic situation would be much worse without section 936."7 Section
936 presents a classic dilemma: Puerto Rico has become so dependent
on section 936 for investment that it feels that its economy cannot sur-
vive without it, while a growing number of Washington constituents
feel that the national budget can no longer afford to support the costly
investment incentive.218 Politically, Puerto Rico has become mired in its
Commonwealth status, which fails to provide the Puerto Rican people
with either adequate representation or adequate self-determination. 9
Although the retention of section 936 and the addition of the Twin
Plant Program attempt to solve some of the abuses of the tax credit and
to give Puerto Rico some autonomy, Puerto Rico's economic depen-
dence on section 936 and the United States will prevent the island from
reaping any long-term benefits.
5.1. Puerto Rico's Economic Problems
The economic problems of other Caribbean nations220 are shared
by Puerto Rico. Although Puerto Rico has a good infrastructure and
educational system, 21 it also has many seemingly insurmountable ob-
stacles to economic growth. Unemployment on the island fluctuates be-
tween twenty and twenty-five percent;22 the majority of the Puerto Ri-
217 Tax Breaks, supra note 12, at 20.
218 Turner, Is It Time to End Puerto Rican Tax Haven?, J. Com., July 11, 1985,
at 15A, col. 1.
s See infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
2 See Puerto Rico and the CBI, supra note 131, at 5.
222 See Rublin, supra note 102, at 6 (estimating Puerto Rican unemployment to
be about 20% as of March 1986); 131 CONG. REC. E1485 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985)
(statement of Hon. Jaime B. Fuster); Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note
9, at 4987 (statement of Gov. Hernindez Col6n). Economists argue that Puerto Rico's
unemployment rate would be even higher if the public sector did not employ significant
numbers of people to do trivial tasks. See Rivera, supra note 95, at 150; see also Com-
prehensive Tax Reform, Part 9, supra note 106, at 9105 (stating that even with § 936,
unemployment is expected to rise to 27% by 1990); id. at 9106 (letter from Prof. Jos6
Fellx Resto to Hon. Joseph K. Dowley) (stating that chronic unemployment causes an
increase in Puerto Rican migration to mainland United States). Interestingly, other
possessions benefitting from § 936 do not have an unemployment problem. In both the
Virgin Islands and American Samoa, unemployment stands at approximately 5.8%,
lower than United States mainland unemployment. Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part
6, supra note 9, at 4972-73.
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can people depend on food stamps.22 The oil crisis of the late 1970s
hurt Puerto Rico far more than it hurt the United States. 2 4 Puerto
Rico also suffers from a competitive wage disadvantage: workers in Pu-
erto Rico do not compete with workers in the United States, but rather
compete against lower wage workers in Third World countries in the
Caribbean, the Far East, and similar areas.225 Puerto Rico's higher
wages and more highly skilled workforce often disadvantage rather
than aid the island under these circumstances.
Although Section 936 continues to be lauded by Puerto Rican
leaders, its continuing existence, despite the addition of the Twin Plant
Program, may not improve Puerto Rico's economic condition. In fact,
critics of section 936 assert that, contrary to helping Puerto Rico
achieve economic growth, implementation of section 936 actually aggra-
vates the island's worsening economic condition.226 The rush to manu-
facturing encouraged by section 936 and Puerto Rican tax exemption
has left Puerto Rico's agriculture in a deplorable state.22 Furthermore,
222 A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 17; Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 570;
Tansill, supra note 22, at 99 (stating that 7 out of every 10 Puerto Rican households
receive food stamps); Tax Breaks, supra note 12, at 20. The increased dependence of
Puerto Ricans on the United States welfare system only increases Puerto Rico's depen-
dence on the United States as a whole. Garda-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 279. One
critic argues that federal budget cuts in welfare programs will have "a much more
devastating and lasting impact" than will a revision of § 936. Id. at 281. Puerto Rico's
lack of adequate representation in Congress, however, prevents the Puerto Rican people
from having any say in federal budget cuts of welfare and food stamp programs affect-
ing them. See id.; infra note 250 and accompanying text.
224 The island depends on imported oil for almost all of its energy needs. At the
time of the crisis, for example, Puerto Rico was using oil for 93% of its energy needs,
while the comparable dependence rate for the mainland United States was 16%. Tan-
sill, supra note 22, at 98. Puerto Rican dependence on imported oil has been estimated
to be as high as 99%. A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 17; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Part III, supra note 99, at 1378; Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 9, supra note 106,
at 9102.
225 See 131 CONG. REC. E1360 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985) (letter from Bill Richard-
son, Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus). These countries' lack of, e.g.,
minimum wage laws and environmental laws, which the United States has imposed in
Puerto Rico, would make these places a comparatively more favorable environment for
investment were it not for § 936. Id.
22 See Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 569-72 (discussing effects of tax
exemptions on employment, interest rates, and concentration of wealth in Puerto Rico);
Rivera, supra note 95, at 147-67 (discussing § 936 effects on overall Puerto Rican
economy); see also Sheridan, Puerto Rico: Commonwealth, Independence, or State-
hood?, 40 REv. COL. AB. P.R. 291, 294 (1979) (stating that supporters of indepen-
dence believe that Puerto Rico's economic problems are caused by United States capital
on the island).
2217 Pastor, supra note 2, at 1051 (stating that, as a result of Operation Bootstrap,
Puerto Rico lost more jobs in agriculture than it gained in manufacturing); Rivera,
supra .note 95, at 146; Tansill, supra note 22, at 98-99; cf. CBI and U.S. Minority
Participation, supra note 76, at 23 (statement of Lawrence Theriot) (stating that other
Caribbean nations suffer from the same problem). But see Martin, supra note 56, at 7
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the hopes that Puerto Rican leaders placed on the influx of United
States manufacturing to deliver the island from poverty have not suc-
ceeded.22 Although initially the section 936 corporations employed
thousands of Puerto Rican people, total employment in manufacturing
has remained constant since 1973.2
In addition, section 936 and Puerto Rican tax incentives to United
States corporations have created tax inequities in Puerto Rico, espe-
cially the overtaxation of Puerto Rico's middle class. The middle class
of Puerto Rico is taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than the middle
class of the United States, while large corporations pay little or no tax
at all.230 The continuation of section 936 also creates problems for local
Puerto Rican investment. Unlike section 936 companies, Puerto Rican
companies are taxed on their income in Puerto Rico.2 1 This situation
tends to discourage local Puerto Rican investment and entrepreneurial
activity.
232
Finally, some critics fault section 936 because of its misplaced fo-
cus. They believe section 936 has accommodated the desires of foreign
investors, rather than protecting and promoting the interests of the Pu-
erto Rican people.233 Because of worsening economic problems and the
(stating that for Puerto Rico to have an efficient agricultural economy would require "a
level of output per acre far beyond the realm of possibility").
228 At the time of the proposed repeal of § 936 in 1985, 63% of the Puerto Rican
population was living below the 1985 poverty level. 131 CONG. REC. E1360 (daily ed.
Apr. 4, 1985) (letter from Bill Richardson, Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus); see also 131 CONG. REc. E4631 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1985) (statement of Hon.
Fuster) (discussing the shantytowns where many Puerto Ricans still live); Costas
Elena, pt. 2, supra note 89, at 148 ("To the average Puerto Rican the benefits of
I.R.C. section 936 have not trickled down.").
2 Treasury Department, supra note 14, at 328; Martin, supra note 56, at 8.
Approximately 6.5% of Puerto Ricans work in manufacturing, compared to 11% in the
mainland United States. An 11% rate of manufacturing employment in Puerto Rico
would produce 100,000 .new jobs. Id. But see Highley, Sec. 936 Still Spurs Industry,
J. Com., June 7, 1983, at 13, col. 3 ("From 1970 to 1980, manufacturing employment
increased by 13.1%, [a growth rate] which is 2.8 times as fast as . . . mainland manu-
facturing employment .... ").
"' See Costas Elena, pt. 3, supra note 89, at 240-41; Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra
note 89, at 571. Even though Governor Hernindez Col6n has implemented tax reform,
maximum personal income tax rates are still as high as 50%, compared to the United
States maximum rate of 28% for individuals and 33% for corporations. See Rublin,
supra note 102, at 7.
2I See Costas Elena, pt. 1, supra note 89, at 234, 240-41.
212 See id. at 234 (stating that tax-exempt businesses in Puerto Rico compete un-
fairly with taxable Puerto Rican corporations); Martin, supra note 56, at 7-8 ("Of the
roughly 150,000 jobs in manufacturing, no more than 40,000 are employed in plants
that are locally owned."). But see Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at
5021 (stating that existence of § 936 helps train Puerto Rican workers to become
emerging entrepreneurs).
22' Costas Elena, pt. 4, supra note 89, at 625-30. Costas Elena seems to prefer
some sort of quid pro quo system by which tax-exempt companies in Puerto Rico
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
failure of section 936 as a model of development,"' the continuation of
section 936 only perpetuates the economic dependence of Puerto Rico
on the United States.2"5 The island economy depends greatly on the
influx of United States investment. Should the United States repeal sec-
tion 936, Puerto Rico would be faced with the migration of its people
to the mainland and the adoption of an extended public works
program. 3 6
The dangers of Puerto Rican dependence are numerous. First, de-
pendence on the United States causes the Puerto Rican economy to be
much more susceptible to recessions on the United States mainland. 3
Second, Puerto Rico has no industrial development programs of its
own: industrial development on the island centers on the attraction of
United States investment through United States and Puerto Rican tax
incentives.233 Finally, Puerto Rico's status as a Commonwealth 3 .
makes economic dependence on the United States more dangerous: with
no adequate representation in Congress, Puerto Rico has little say in its
own development.24°
Since his inauguration as Governor of Puerto Rico in 1985, Her-
n~ndez Col6n has sought to reduce Puerto Rico's dependence on the
United States. His efforts have included personal tax reform and bank-
ing reform, as well as implementation of the Twin Plant Program.
41
However, it is not likely that his attempts at economic independence
would receive exemption based on investment rather than on profit.
234 See generally Lewis, The Failings of Operation Bootstrap, in 1 READINGS IN
CARIBBEAN HISTORY AND ECONoMIcS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGION 262 (R.
Delson ed. 1981) (discussing the disappointing outcome of efforts to improve the Puerto
Rican economy by means of tax preferences and industrial development).
235 See Costas Elena, pt. 4, supra note 89, at 630-33; id. at 630 (Fomento income
tax exemptions "have increased not decreased Puerto Rican economic dependency.")
(emphasis added).
28 For a discussion of the deficiencies of these alternatives, see Lewis, supra note
234, at 267-68.
237 Id. at 268.
28 The Twin Plant Program attempts to reduce this dependence by giving some
autonomy to Puerto Rico to attract investment to CBI nations. See Government Devel-
opment Bank Loan Policies, supra note 137, at 8.
211 See infra Section 5.2.
"I See Lewis, supra note 234, at 269 (discussing the extent to which Puerto Rico
is already dependent on the United States Congress and federal regulatory agencies for
such matters as air traffic, shipping, immigration control, and postal communications).
241 Compare P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3011-3012 (1978) with P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 13, § 3011(a) (Supp. 1986) (reducing highest marginal tax rate from 72% to
50% for taxable years commencing after December 31, 1985). See Rublin, supra note
102, at 7 (the maximum personal income tax rate has been lowered to 50%; that on
savings deposit interest to 17%); Martin, supra note 56, at 9 (stating that the present
tax system encourages "the flight of capital from the island" and that Gov. Hernfndez
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will succeed under the present system. As long as Puerto Rico remains
a Commonwealth, economic dependence is likely to continue. 42 More-
over, the United States has discouraged Puerto Rico from attempting to
attract foreign nations to invest in the island.24 3 Although to some ex-
tent Puerto Rico has enjoyed benefits from its dependence on the
United States, continued dependence will only serve to narrow markets
which Puerto Rico could otherwise reach2 44 and postpone any Puerto
Rican notions of self-determination.
5.2. Puerto Rico's Political Status and Status Alternatives
Puerto Rico has governed itself as a Commonwealth of the United
States since 1952.145 As Commonwealth citizens, many Puerto Ricans
feel they have the best of both worlds: they enjoy United States citizen-
ship24 which allows them to migrate to the mainland without immi-
gration restrictions, 247 while they retain their language and culture.
The development of section 936, moreover, is dependent on the devel-
opment of Puerto Rico as a Commonwealth; if Puerto Rico's political
status changed, it would lose its section 936 tax credit and thus its most
effective means of drawing investment.2 48
242 See Lewis, supra note 234, at 269.
24S See Tax Breaks, supra note 12, at 20; see also Rublin, supra note 102, at 7
(discussing Gov. Hernindez Col6n's efforts to attract Japanese investment).
244 See Lewis, supra note 234, at 269.
245 The law establishing Puerto Rico as a Commonwealth was passed by Con-
gress on July 3, 1950. An Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional
Government by the People of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950)
(codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731e (1982)). The Act was approved by a referendum
of the Puerto Rican people on June 4, 1951. A delegation was then formed to establish
a Constitution of the Commonwealth; the Constitution was approved by the Puerto
Rican people and Congress and put into effect on July 25, 1952. See Tansill, supra
note 22, at 91. For a history of the United States occupation of Puerto Rico prior to
Commonwealth status, see Geyls, supra note 23, at 410-36.
2"6 Puerto Ricans were granted the status of United States nationals by the
Foraker Act, ch. 191, § 7, 31 Stat. 77, 79 (1900) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §
733 (1982)), and were granted full United States citizenship in 1917 by the Jones Act,
ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 733a
(1982)). Conferral of United States citizenship was objectionable to many Puerto Rican
leaders who feared that such citizenship would be a hindrance to any Puerto Rican
independence efforts. See Tansill, supra note 22, at 87.
247 Moreovet, if a Puerto Rican migrates to the United States and meets one of
the states' voting registration requirements, she can vote for federal and state candidates
for office, a privilege she would not have as a citizen of one of the 50 states residing in
Puerto Rico. Tansill, supra note 22, at 92.
24" Should Puerto Rico become independent, it would most likely lose the benefits
of § 936. Independence would put Puerto Rico outside of the United States tariff sys-
tem, hence making investment there less profitable for United States companies. Sheri-
dan, supra note 226, at 295. If Puerto Rico became a state, the United States Constitu-
tion would require that taxation of Puerto Rican corporations be equivalent to that of
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Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status has its disadvantages. Al-
though Puerto Rico has several advantages of association with the
United States such as citizenship and section 936,249 it lacks essential
privileges which states enjoy, such as adequate representation in Con-
gress. 5 ' Furthermore, because of Puerto Rico's lack of independence,
its investments are not protected by trade treaties with the United
States.25'
Whether they advocate Puerto Rican statehood or independence,
many commentators view Puerto Rico's Commonwealth position as a
second-class status.252 In addition, other nations view Puerto Rico's
Commonwealth status as a temporary status, and have asked the
United Nations for assistance in clarifying this issue.253
United States corporations in other states, and § 936 would accordingly have to be
repealed. Highley, Puerto Rican Tax Plan Raises Legal Questions, J. Com., Dec. 18,
1984, at 5A, col. 1; O'Reilly, Economy Set to Rebound as US Recovery Begins, J.
Com., June 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
249 Other advantages enjoyed by Puerto Rico because of its association with the
United States include federal grants-in-aid to the island, food stamps, federal postal and
currency systems, and access to the United States Supreme Court as final arbiter of
Puerto Rican disputes. Tansill, supra note 22, at 93, 99. In addition, most of the provi-
sions of the United States Constitution are applicable to Puerto Rico. Geyls, supra note
23, at 433. Moreover, Puerto Rican individuals, because they are not citizens of one of
the 50 states, pay no United States income taxes (although Puerto Rican individual
income taxes are generally higher than those on the mainland). Id.; Costas Elena, pt. 3,
supra note 89, at 242.
250 Puerto Rico actually enjoyed more representation under Spanish monarchy
than it has ever had under United States democracy. Under Spanish rule in the 1890s,
Puerto Rico sent 20 delegates to the Spanish Cortes, each having "'full power to vote
[and] . . . represent their people.'" Tansill, supra note 22, at 83 (quoting 36 CONG.
REC. 292 (1963) (remarks of James L. Sloyden)). See L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at
157. As a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto Rico has never had a represen-
tative in the United States Senate, and until 1902 did not have a representative in the
United States House of Representatives. Tansill, supra note 22, at 85-86. Currently,
Puerto Rico's representative to the House may speak on the floor, but cannot vote
there, although he may vote in committee. Id. at 93. Furthermore, Puerto Rico's Gov-
ernor was appointed by the President until 1948, at which time Puerto Rico held its
first popular election. Id. at 90.
This lack of representation was especially critical during the Treasury Depart-
ment's recent attempt to repeal § 936, see supra Section 3.2.1 and accompanying notes,
and replace it with a wage credit: the Governor of Puerto Rico was not even consulted
concerning the proposed repeal. Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at
5003.
251 See O'Reilly, Puerto Rico Optimistic On Keeping Tax Benefits, J. Com., Oct.
9, 1985, at 4A, col. 3.
252 See 131 CONG. REc. S8755 (daily ed. June 25, 1985) (statement of Sen. Si-
mon). Historically, the Puerto Rican people have not sought independence, but, rather,
simple dignity in whatever status they held, whether as a Spanish colony or as a United
States possession. See Sheridan, supra note 226, at 295 ("Neither statehood nor inde-
pendence advocates believe that [dignity] is provided by Commonwealth status."); Tan-
sill, supra note 22, at 83.
253 Since the late 1970s, Latin American countries including Venezuela have made
repeated statements in the United Nations calling for the decolonization of Puerto Rico.
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The advocates of Puerto Rican statehood254 insist that statehood is
the only means by which Puerto Rico can assure itself of keeping bene-
fits that Congress has conferred upon it."5 They further argue that the
Commonwealth status is not a permanent status,256 but rather a throw-
back to nineteenth century colonialism.257 They fear the independence
movement, believing that it will drive Puerto Rico away from the
United States and ally it with enemy forces in the Caribbean.25
Critics of the statehood alternative argue that if Puerto Rico be-
came a state, the Puerto Rican people would lose their language and
culture.259 They further argue that Puerto Rico's economic problems
are strictly local in nature, and Puerto Rico needs to retain local auton-
omy in order to properly deal with the unique nature of these
problems.260
Advocates of Puerto Rican independence believe that independence
is the best way to stabilize Puerto Rico economically, stop terrorism,
and give Puerto Rico a constructive position in the Caribbean Basin.
21
They believe, as do the statehood advocates, that the Commonwealth
status is not permanent, and, unless the United States becomes more
responsive to Puerto Rican unrest, the United States could be con-
fronted with political unrest such as that which exists in Northern Ire-
Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 290-91.
' As recently as April 1986, advocates of Puerto Rican statehood have petitioned
the United States Congress for hearings on this matter. 132 CONG. REC. H1807 (daily
ed. Apr. 14, 1986).
255 Status of Puerto Rico, Hearings before the United States-Puerto Rico Commis-
sion on the Status of Puerto Rico, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1965) [hereinafter Status
Hearings] (statement of Dr. Santos Amadeo).
258 Id.; see Geyls, supra note 23, at 445 ("[T]he United States has not ... given
a final solution to the status of Puerto Rico, either by making it a part of the Union or
recognizing it as a sovereign nation."). After approving Puerto Rico's Commonwealth
status, the United States Congress declared that it "did not intend to settle, once and for
all, the status of the island." Tansill, supra note 22, at 92.
111 Status Hearings, supra note 255, at 155 (stating that Puerto Rico under Com-
monwealth status remained a territory or possession of the United States).
258 Id. at 163.
25' See Sheridan, supra note 226, at 295 (stating that "it is not clear how recep-
tive Congress would be to the admission of a largely Spanish-speaking state"); see also
Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 276. But see Status Hearings, supra note 255,
at 82 (stating that, should Puerto Rico become a state, it could continue its bilingual
culture); id. at 124 (stating that the right of Puerto Ricans to speak Spanish is pro-
tected by the United States Constitution).
260 Status Hearings, supra note 255, at 195 (statement of Raphael Hernindez
Col6n). One of Puerto Rico's economic problems is its low per capita income: although
Puerto Rico's economic situation is much better than those of its Caribbean neighbors,
Puerto Rico's per capita income is "less than one-half of that of the poorest state of the
Union." Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part 9, supra note 106, at 1324; Hearings on the
CBI, supra note 66, at 54.
281 See Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 294; Rivera, supra note 95, at 171;
Sheridan, supra note 226, at 294.
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land or Quebec.26" Advocates of independence have gone so far as to
ask the United States Congress for a report concerning the "decoloniza-
tion" of Puerto Rico, delineating conditions under which Puerto Rico
would become either a state or an independent country, or modification
of the present Commonwealth to become a "Free Association."
6 3
Critics of the independence movement point to its traditionally
leftist leanings,'" and resent outside groups such as the United Nations
encouraging the independence movement.26 Some opponents of Puerto
Rican independence point out that Puerto Ricans, as United States citi-
zens, cannot be deprived of their citizenship under the United States
Constitution.266
In 1965, the United States Congress set up a Commission to dis-
cuss the nature of Puerto Rico's political status to the United States.67
One of the principal determinations of this Commission was that the
Puerto Rican people must take the first step toward any change in po-
litical status.266 This process has typically taken place by means of a
referendum requiring a supermajority of the Puerto Rican people to
approve the change.269 Not much has changed since 1965: if anything,
282 Garcia-Passalaqua, supra note 22, at 293; see also L. LANGLEY, supra note
23, at 260-65 (arguing that Puerto Rico's domination by the United States makes its
situation more akin to that of Ireland under British rule than to that of a typical Third
World country).
282 Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 291.
28 Cf id. at 278-79. Moreover, the independence movement in Puerto Rico has
traditionally spawned violence and terrorism. See L. LANGLEY, supra note 23, at 261-
62; Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 285-87; Sheridan, supra note 226, at 292;
see also A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing guerrilla activity in Puerto Rico led
by the Macheteros, a pro-independence group).
265 Status Hearings, supra note 255, at 123; Sheridan, supra note 226, at 292.
288 Geyls, supra note 23, at 440. This position has been discounted by the results
of the United States-Puerto Rican Commission's conclusion that all three status alter-
natives are constitutional. See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico COM-
MISSION ON THE STATUS OF PUERTO Rico 6 (1966) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
287 Its findings were published as the COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 266; see
also Tansill, supra note 22, at 94.
288 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 266, at 6-8; see Garcia-Passalacqua, supra
note 22, at 292 (stating that "the Puerto Ricans must make up their minds first" about
their political status).
289 Several referenda, or plebiscites, have been held, with no indication on the part
of the Puerto Rican people of any desire to change from the Commonwealth status. In
1967, a plebescite was held, with the Commonwealth status winning 60.4% of the vote,
statehood 33.9% and independence only 6.0%. Tansill, supra note 22, at 94; see Sheri-
dan, supra note 226, at 292 (stating incorrectly that the independence supporters re-
ceived only .06% of the vote).
At the time of Puerto Rico's establishment as a Commonwealth, political parties
developed around Puerto Rico's commonwealth status and other status alternatives.
Tax Breaks, supra note 12, at 20. The Commonwealth status is advocated by the Pop-
ular Democratic Party (PDP), the statehood alternative by the New Progressive Party
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Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status has become even more deeply en-
trenched. One of the key determinations of the 1965-1966 Commission
was that Puerto Rican economic growth had to be maximized in order
for the people of Puerto Rico to assess the merits of each status alterna-
tive.17 0 Because the possessions tax credit at the time of the Commission
was an integral part of Puerto Rican economic development, it became
an integral part of Puerto Rican status determination. The members of
the Commission did not envision the development of the total interde-
pendence of section 936 and Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status.271 It
is ironic, therefore, that the Commonwealth status is the only alterna-
tive which does not provide Puerto Rico with adequate representation
to retain section 936.272
6. EVALUATION OF PUERTO RIco's POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONDITION: THE CBI MODEL
For the most part, Caribbean nations have sought to avoid the
problems of the Puerto Rican model by adjusting their economies to
prevent foreign domination and its exploitation.273 In fact, United
(NPP), and the independence alternative by the Partido Independentista Puertorri-
quefio (PIP). See Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 276; see also Tansill, supra
note 22, at 83-95 (discussing the historical development of political parties in Puerto
Rico and the rise of the PDP and the NPP).
Since Puerto Rico's establishment as a commonwealth, power has shuttled be-
tween the commonwealth party and the statehood party. In recent elections, the com-
monwealth and statehood parties have received virtually equal percentages of the vote,
with swing votes provided by the independence party. A. PAYNE, supra note 2, at 17-
18; Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 273, 276.
The Puerto Rican people can see little advantage in changing their status, since
economic and political conditions under either statehood or independence are only spec-
ulative. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 95, at 167-81. Many Puerto Rican leaders envi-
sion economic chaos should section 936 be repealed. See supra notes 124-28 and accom-
panying text.
270 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 266, at 8.
27 Costas Elena, pt. 4, supra note 89, at 649.
217 See A Bad Idea Worries Puerto Rico, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at A18, col.
1.
'73 See Braveboy-Wagner, supra note 16, at 166-67. Braveboy-Wagner describes
the reasoning by which Third World leaders rejected foreign domination of their
economies:
[I]t was realized that uncontrolled capitalism generated . . . foreign domi-
nation of Third World economies and excessive dependence on external
forces with a subsequent subrogation of political power; decapitalization
by foreign private enterprise; an increase in imports with adverse affects
on the balance of payments; the decline of agriculture with the growth of
industry and urbanization; rising unemployment as people moved to the
cities while capital-intensive industries and those with limited opportunity
for expansion failed to produce enough jobs; more urban crime; and a
widening of the gap between the elites and the masses, city and country-
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States scholars have rejected the Puerto Rican model as a pattern for
development of the CBI.2 74 Instead, economic independence is being
fostered through joint ventures,275 trading companies2 76 and subcon-
tracting. These structures ensure the commitment of the CBI country to
the success of the ventures, and also reduce the risks for the United
States corporation. In addition, CBI countries can pursue investment
opportunities with trading partners other than the United States.
2 77
Puerto Rico is essentially restricted from the same opportunities
which the CBI seeks to promote. As indicated above, the United States
discourages Puerto Rico from soliciting investment from other foreign
countries."" Furthermore, even though the Twin Plant Program en-
courages joint ventures, the joint venture occurs between a Caribbean
Basin corporation and a United States corporation, rather than between
a Caribbean Basin corporation and a Puerto Rican corporation. Unless
Puerto Rico can achieve some level of economic independence from the
United States, any benefits to Puerto Rico in the Caribbean Basin
apart from those emanating from the United States will be short lived.
Rather than allow Puerto Rico to continue to suffer under a re-
jected development model, the United States must fashion a new model
side, and workers and management.
Id. at 167.
2174 See Hearings on the CB1, supra note 66, at 49 (statement of Richard Weiss-
koff); see also Review of the CBI, supra note 2, at 459 (statement of Stuart K. Tucker,
Fellow, Overseas Development Council) (stating that "the CBI will have a minimal
effect, and the effects will be slow in coming").
275 See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1047 ("[J]oint ventures.., would be the best way
to guarantee both investments and good relations in the long term and also help the
local private sector."); see also id. at 1056 (emphasizing the importance of joint ven-
tures to reduce the possibility of Caribbean nations becoming economically dependent
on United States industry). The CBI is currently promoting the joint-venture concept,
and should continue to do so. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 3 ("The CB1 also is
creating opportunities for direct involvement by United States firms in joint ventures,
subcontract manufacturing, technology licensing and other types of offshore opera-
tions."); CBI Business Opportunities, 3 CBI Bus. BULL., Dec. 1986, at 2-3 (virtually
all CBI business opportunities described in that publication were in the form of joint
ventures or subcontracts).
2'76 Trading companies would help numerous small Caribbean nations "character-
ized by many small manufacturers and farmers who will never be large enough to
handle export marketing." A trading company could consolidate the economic power of
these small entrepreneurs to create a comparative advantage for the country as a whole.
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, supra note 2, at 27.
217 Pastor, supra note 2, at 1056 (stating the importance of foreign investment
and trade incentives). United States investors should also be aware of other nations'
preferential treatment of Caribbean Basin nations and use these preferences to struc-
ture an export base in the Caribbean through which they can export to countries under
other preferential schemes. The United States could then cooperate with other nations
to ensure the success of economic growth and development in the Caribbean Basin. See
DELEGATION MISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 43.
278 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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to once again assure Puerto Rico's place as the "Shining Star of the
Caribbean. 279 The section 936 investment incentives and the Twin
Plant Program, however, necessitate the continuance of section 936 for
at least the duration of the CBI.280 Moreover, supporters of section 936
argue that the program has never been given a chance to work for any
number of years without either Congress or the Treasury Department
tampering with it."'1
One of the main problems with replacing section 936 with a better
alternative is that all attempts by the United States Treasury Depart-
ment and congressional committees to do so have been hurried, based
on faulty economic data, and so ineffective that Puerto Ricans have had
no choice but to request the continuance of the status quo.2" 2 In order
to ensure Puerto Rico economic and political stability, however, the
United States should begin to wean Puerto Rico from economic depen-
dence on the United States. Local Puerto Rican industry, rather than
section 936 investment, should be fostered and encouraged, particularly
within the Twin Plant Program. Puerto Ricans would then feel more
committed toward the success of their island's economic development,
rather than constantly relying on the United States to solve their eco-
nomic problems. The United States should also support investment by
other countries in Puerto Rico, and perhaps even encourage Puerto Ri-
can participation in trading organizations. Finally, the continuation of
section 936 should be carefully analyzed, not from the perspective of
United States tax losses, but from the perspective of Puerto Rico's eco-
nomic problems.2"' Moreover, should a consensus to eliminate section
936 be reached, the transition should be designed to be as trouble-free
as possible for Puerto Rico. Ways to continue to encourage investment
while eliminating the investment incentive should include a long
phaseout period that would limit investment attrition from the island,
continuation of Puerto Rico's involvement in the CBI, and assistance to
Puerto Rican officials in the formulation of their own investment
2" See Martin, supra note 56, at 9.
280 See Comprehensive Tax Reform, Part 6, supra note 9, at 5044 ("[I]f 936 goes,
the whole twin-plant financing scheme also goes.").
281 See Culpeper, supra note 102, at 69 (proposing a 5-10 year moratorium on
further changes in § 936).
282 The attempt to shift to a wage credit in 1984-85 was one such fiasco. In short,
much more time, research and analysis must go into any decision to replace a section of
the Internal Revenue Code which has been in existence for over half a century and
upon which 3.3 million United States citizens rely. See supra notes 117-28 and accom-
panying text.
282 See Costas Elena, pt. 4, supra note 89, at 661-66. Costas Elena believes that,
since the Puerto Rican Government is either unwilling or unable to reform § 936, the
United States Government should do so. Id.
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incentives.
Because Section 936 is linked to the continuation of Puerto Rico as
a Commonwealth, the United States should also take a more active role
with regard to Puerto Rico's political status. A referendum should be
called to determine the present sentiments of the Puerto Rican people.
The results will then be used to structure a program of steering Puerto
Rico slowly but stably toward a less dependent form of government.28'
This referendum should assure the Puerto Rican people that, no matter
what the outcome, a gradual transition would occur, accompanied by a
United States commitment to continue aid for a stated period of time.
For it is only when Puerto Rico is economically and politically inde-
pendent that it will be able to determine its future status.
7. CONCLUSION
"For reasons of security, economics, and morality, United States
policy-makers should conceive of Puerto Rico as an essential element in
the long-range stability of the Central American and Caribbean com-
munity. '2 85 The United States has recognized the similar historical and
economic background shared by its Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
the other nations of the Caribbean Basin.288 Consequently, in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, the United States has allowed Puerto Rico to in-
teract with the CBI nations to promote the Twin Plant Program, a
private investment development plan which fosters both economic
growth and regional integration.28
The United States must realize that section 936 and the Twin
Plant Program are not cure-alls for Caribbean economic development;
fundamental Caribbean problems such as political instability, inade-
quate infrastructure, and reluctance to diversify production into non-
traditional exports may persist despite United States' efforts to solve
them. The United States must be careful, however, not to replicate the
Puerto Rican example of economic dependence in other Caribbean Ba-
sin countries.288 Therefore, efforts to encourage economic independence
284 See Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 22, at 292-94.
285 Id. at 293.
286 See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
287 See supra Section 3.2.2.
288 In order to avoid replicating the mistakes made in Puerto Rico, assembly oper-
ations could be deemphasized and agricultural development and local industry pro-
moted. See Pastor, supra note 2, at 1051 ("[Alssembly operations alone not only foster
dependence, they also miss valuable development opportunities to multiply invest-
ment."). Furthermore, continued efforts must be made to deal with the fundamental
problems of the region through joint ventures with local investors rather than by simply
overwhelming the area with outside capital furnished by United States investors. See
Boodhoo, supra note 2, at 89 ("It is then, and only then, that the United States will
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through joint ventures and multilateral trade preferences must be con-
tinued.2" Additionally, the United States must remember that economic
stability must be the focal point for Caribbean Basin policy,290 because
it is through economic stability that political stability is fostered. 1
Although aid to the Caribbean Basin should be continued, espe-
cially to countries with poor infrastructures, increasing emphasis should
be placed on the trade and private investment provisions of the CBI.
Additional incentives should be given to investors committed to building
plants in less stable couuntries, and to those willing to produce new
non-traditional products for export. In particular, local Caribbean in-
vestment and innovation should be encouraged, and every attempt
should be made to limit protectionist statements among United States
government officials. Recent Congressional efforts to amend and im-
prove the CBI should be continued.
Above all, the United States cannot lose focus of the economic and
political problems of Puerto Rico as the United States moves forward
with its Caribbean policy. The interrelationship between Puerto Rico's
Commonwealth status and section 936 fosters economic dependence.
Therefore, a new model must be developed to promote local Puerto
Rican industry and further Puerto Rican autonomy. The United States
must proceed with care, however, since recent attempts to uproot the
established economic system have been met with stiff resistance from
Puerto Rican leaders. Careful research must go into any decision to
alter Puerto Rico's economic position to ensure the continued political
stability of the island.
contribute to developing rather than exploiting the Caribbean Basin.").
28 See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
2,0 See Harrison, supra note 35, at 43.
29 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
1987]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
